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Cooley v. Board of Wardens
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| Cooley v. Board of Wardens | |
| Reference: 53 U.S. 299 | |
| Term: 1852 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: February 9-11, 1852 Decided: March 2, 1852 | |
| Outcome | |
| Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed | |
| Majority | |
| Benjamin Robbins Curtis • Roger Brooke Taney • John Catron • John McKinley • Samuel Nelson • Robert Cooper Grier | |
| Dissenting | |
| John McLean • James Moore Wayne • Peter Vivian Daniel | |
Cooley v. Board of Wardens is a case decided on March 2, 1852, by the United States Supreme Court holding that states can regulate interstate commerce as long as such regulations do not conflict with federal law. The case concerned whether a Pennsylvania law requiring ships to hire a local pilot violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.[1][2][3]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that when local circumstances make it necessary, states have the authority to regulate interstate commerce as long as such regulations do not conflict with federal law. To read more about the impact of Cooley v. Board of Wardens click here.
Background
A Pennsylvania law was enacted in 1803 to require ships entering or departing from the port of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to hire a local pilot. Those that refused were subject to pay a fine. Cooley, a ship owner, refused to hire a local pilot or pay the fine on the grounds that the state law violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Cooley's argument. A writ of error was filed and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the state court.[1][3]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held between February 9, 1852, and February 11, 1852. The case was decided on March 2, 1852.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 6-3 to affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis delivered the opinion of the court. Justices John McLean and James Moore Wayne dissented. Justice Peter Vivian Daniel concurred with the judgment of the court, but dissented against the court's reasoning.[1][2]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis, writing for the court, argued that the regulations set forth in the Pennsylvania law are equivalent to other regulations that states establish regarding pilotage services. Curtis wrote that the Pennsylvania law fits within the scope of other state pilotage regulations and is therefore valid.[2]
| “ | We think this particular regulation concerning half-pilotage fees is an appropriate part of a general system of regulations of this subject. Testing it by the practice of commercial states and countries legislating on this subject, we find it has usually been deemed necessary to make similar provisions. Numerous laws of this kind are cited in the learned argument of the counsel for the defendant in error, and their fitness as a part of the system of pilotage in many places may be inferred from their existence in so many different states and countries. Like other laws, they are framed to meet the most usual cases quae frequentius accidunt; they rest upon the propriety of securing lives and property exposed to the perils of a dangerous navigation by taking on board a person peculiarly skilled to encounter or avoid them, upon the policy of discouraging the commanders of vessels from refusing to receive such persons on board at the proper times and places, and upon the expediency, and even intrinsic justice, of not suffering those who have incurred labor and expense and danger to place themselves in a position to render important service generally necessary to go unrewarded because the master of a particular vessel either rashly refuses their proffered assistance or, contrary to the general experience, does not need it. There are many cases, in which an offer to perform, accompanied by present ability to perform, is deemed by law equivalent to performance. The laws of commercial states and countries have made an offer of pilotage service one of those cases, and we cannot pronounce a law which does this to be so far removed from the usual and fit scope of laws for the regulation of pilots and pilotage as to be deemed, for this cause, a covert attempt to legislate upon another subject under the appearance of legislating on this one. [4] | ” |
| —Benjamin Robbins Curtis, majority opinion in Cooley v. Board of Wardens[2] | ||
Curtis also argued that the Commerce Clause does not explicitly prevent states from having the authority to create regulations relating to interstate commerce.
| “ | The grant of commercial power to Congress does not contain any terms which expressly exclude the states from exercising an authority over its subject matter. If they are excluded, it must be because the nature of the power thus granted to Congress requires that a similar authority should not exist in the states. If it were conceded, on the one side, that the nature of this power, like that to legislate for the District of Columbia, is absolutely and totally repugnant to the existence of similar power in the states, probably no one would deny that the grant of the power to Congress as effectually and perfectly excludes the states from all future legislation on the subject as if express words had been used to exclude them. And, on the other hand, if it were admitted that the existence of this power in Congress, like the power of taxation, is compatible with the existence of a similar power in the states, then it would be in conformity with the contemporary exposition of the Constitution (Federalist, No. 32), and with the judicial construction given from time to time by this court, after the most deliberate consideration, to hold that the mere grant of such a power to Congress did not imply a prohibition on the states to exercise the same power, that it is not the mere existence of such a power, but its exercise by Congress, which may be incompatible with the exercise of the same power by the states, and that the states may legislate in the absence of congressional regulations. [4] | ” |
| —Benjamin Robbins Curtis, majority opinion in Cooley v. Board of Wardens[2] | ||
Dissenting opinions
Justice John McLean, in a dissenting opinion, argued that Pennsylvania did not have the authority to pass the law that required ships to hire a local pilot. He contended that the regulations set forth by the law were valid, but that it must have been enacted by the power of Congress.[2]
| “ | From this race of legislation between Congress and the states, and between the states, if this principle be maintained, will arise a conflict similar to that which existed before the adoption of the Constitution. The states favorably situated, as Louisiana, may levy a contribution upon the commerce of other states which shall be sufficient to meet the expenditures of the states. The application of the money exacted under this act of Pennsylvania, it is said, shows that it is not raised for revenue. The application of the money cannot be relied on as showing an act of a state to be constitutional. If the state has power to pass the act, it may apply the money raised in its discretion. I think the charge of half-pilotage is correct under the circumstances, and I only object to the power of the state to pass the law. Congress, to whom the subject peculiarly belongs, should have been applied to, and no doubt it would have adopted the act of the state. [4] | ” |
| —John McLean, dissenting opinion in Cooley v. Board of Wardens[2] | ||
Justice Peter Vivian Daniel wrote an opinion concurring with the decision of the majority of the court, but dissenting with the reasoning for the decision. Daniel argued that the Pennsylvania law was valid because the authority to enact pilot laws is not a power that can be granted uniformly, as it is suggested by the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.[2]
| “ | I agree with the majority in their decision that the judgments of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in these cases should be affirmed, though I cannot go with them in the process or argument by which their conclusion has been reached. The power and the practice of enacting pilot laws, which has been exercised by the states from the very origin of their existence, although it is one in some degree connected with commercial intercourse, does not come essentially and regularly within that power of commercial regulation vested by the Constitution in Congress, and which, by the Constitution, must, when exercised by Congress, be enforced with perfect equality, and without any kind of discrimination, local or otherwise in its application. The power delegated to Congress by the Constitution relates properly to the terms on which commercial engagements may be prosecuted, the character of the articles which they may embrace, the permission or terms according to which they may be introduced, and do not necessarily nor even naturally extend to the means of precaution and safety adopted within the waters or limits of the states by the authority of the latter for the preservation of vessels and cargoes and the lives of navigators or passengers. These last subjects are essentially local -- they must depend upon local necessities which call them into existence, must differ according to the degrees of that necessity. It is admitted on all hands that they cannot be uniform, or even general, but must vary so as to meet the purposes to be accomplished. [4] | ” |
| —Peter Vivian Daniel, dissenting opinion in Cooley v. Board of Wardens[2] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
- See also: Commerce Clause
Cooley v. Board of Wardens established that, while the Commerce Clause grants Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce between states, it does not expressly prohibit states from enacting legislation to establish regulations. The ruling in this case determined that, when local circumstances make it necessary, the states can regulate interstate commerce as long as such regulations do not conflict with federal law. State laws related to commerce powers can be valid if Congress is silent on the matter.
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Oyez, "Cooley v. Board of Wardens," accessed June 14, 2022
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 Justia, "Cooley v. Board of Wardens," accessed June 14, 2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 LexisNexis, "Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens - 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852)," accessed June 14, 2022
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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