In re Oliver
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| In re Oliver | |
| Reference: 333 U.S. 257 | |
| Term: 1948 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: December 16, 1947 Decided: March 8, 1948 | |
| Outcome | |
| Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded | |
| Majority | |
| Hugo Black • Frederick Vinson • Stanley Reed • William Douglas • Frank Murphy • Harold Burton | |
| Concurring | |
| Wiley Rutledge | |
| Dissenting | |
| Felix Frankfurter • Robert H. Jackson | |
In re Oliver is a case decided on March 8, 1948, by the United States Supreme Court that incorporated the right to a public trial of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to states. The case concerned a conviction determined by a one-man grand jury, which did not permit the defendant an opportunity to seek counsel or prepare a defense. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court.[1]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that individuals' Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is applicable in state courts. To read more about the impact of In re Oliver click here.
Background
A witness appeared before a Michigan circuit court judge to provide testimony regarding an investigation on gambling and corruption. The judge was conducting a one-man grand jury and decided that the testimony provided was false, based on the testimony of another witness. The witness was charged with contempt, convicted, and sentenced to serve 60 days in jail. The secrecy of the court proceedings prevented the individual from seeking counsel, preparing a defense, or cross-examining other witnesses.[1]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on December 16, 1947. The case was decided on March 8, 1948.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 7-2 to reverse and remand the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court. Justice Hugo Black delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Wiley Rutledge wrote a concurring opinion. Justices Felix Frankfurter and Robert H. Jackson wrote dissenting opinions.[1]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Justice Hugo Black, writing for the court, argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the right to a public trial to the states. Black contended that all individuals have the right to a fair and public trial, which includes the opportunity to seek counsel and prepare a defense.[1]
| “ | Except for a narrowly limited category of contempts, due process of law as explained in the Cooke case requires that one charged with contempt of court be advised of the charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and have a chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf, either by way of defense or explanation. The narrow exception to these due process requirements includes only charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, are actually observed by the court, and where immediate punishment is essential to prevent 'demoralization of the court's authority . . . before the public.' If some essential elements of the offense are not personally observed by the judge, so that the must depend upon statements made by others for his knowledge about these essential elements, due process requires, according to the Cooke case, that the accused be accorded notice and a fair hearing as above set out.[2] | ” |
| —Hugo Black, majority opinion in In re Oliver[1] | ||
Concurring opinion
Justice Wiley Rutledge, in a concurring opinion, argued that Michigan's one-man grand jury practice violated more constitutional rights than the right to a public trial. Rutledge posited that the one-man grand jury also violated additional Sixth Amendment protections such as the right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to be informed of the cause of one's charge.[1]
| “ | Michigan's one-man grand jury, as exemplified by this record, combines in a single official the historically separate powers of grand jury, committing magistrate, prosecutor, trial judge and petit jury. This aggregated authority denies to the accused not only the right to a public trial, but also those other basic protections secured by the Sixth Amendment, namely, the rights 'to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.' It takes away the security against being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, and denies the equal protection of the laws by leaving to the committing functionary's sole discretion the scope and contents of the record on appeal.[2] | ” |
| —Wiley Rutledge, concurring opinion in In re Oliver[1] | ||
Dissenting opinion
Justice Felix Frankfurter, in a dissenting opinion, argued that states have the authority to establish their own procedures for prosecuting crime and that it should be up to the state court to determine the constitutionality of the case.[1]
| “ | Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may surely adopt as its own a procedure which was the established method for prosecuting crime in nearly half the States which ratified that amendment. And so it may abolish the grand jury, or it may reduce the size of the grand jury, and even to a single member. A State has great leeway in devising its judicial instruments for probing into conduct as a basis for charging the commission of crime. It may, at the same time, surround such preliminary inquiry with safeguards, not only that crime may be detected and criminals punished, but also that charges may be sifted in secret, so as not to injure or embarrass the innocent.[2] | ” |
| —Felix Frankfurter, dissenting opinion in In re Oliver[1] | ||
Justice Robert H. Jackson, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Frankfurter, argued that the issue of the grand jury's secrecy was not the grounds for review established in this case. As a result, Jackson contended that the case should be remanded to the state court.[1]
| “ | The principal ground assigned for reversal of the judgment of conviction is the alleged secrecy of the contempt procedure. That ground was not assigned for review in the petition for certiorari to this Court. Nor was it raised in the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state courts. Therefore, it has not been litigated, and the record has not been made with reference to it. On the other hand, the principal question raised by the petition to this Court and argued by the State is not decided by the Court's opinion.
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” |
| —Robert H. Jackson, dissenting opinion in In re Oliver[1] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
- See also: Incorporation
In re Oliver established that the right to a public trial of the Sixth Amendment applies to state court criminal proceedings.[1]
The decision in this case was responsible for incorporating the right to a public trial to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Incorporation is the process of binding a fundamental right onto the states through a Supreme Court decision.[3]
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 Justia, "In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)," accessed August 31, 2022
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ Bill of Rights Institute, "Incorporation," accessed August 31, 2022
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