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McDonald v. Chicago
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| McDonald v. Chicago | |
| Reference: 561 US 742 | |
| Term: 2010 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: March 2, 2010 Decided: June 28, 2010 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed | |
| Majority | |
| John Roberts • Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito • Antonin Scalia • Anthony Kennedy | |
| Dissenting | |
| Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor • John Paul Stevens | |
McDonald v. Chicago is a case decided on June 28, 2010, by the United States Supreme Court holding 5-4 that municipal laws in Chicago, Illinois, and Oak Park, Illinois, seeking to prohibit citizens from possessing handguns violated the Second Amendment, incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court reversed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.[1][2]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision found that the Chicago and Oak Park ordinances did violate the right to bear arms outlined in the Second Amendment. The case strengthened the precedent established in District of Columbia v. Heller, in which the Supreme Court ruled a Washington, D.C., law prohibiting the possession of handguns unconstitutionally violated the Second Amendment. To read more about the impact of McDonald v. Chicago click here.
Background
The city of Chicago and a suburb, the village of Oak Park, in 2009 passed ordinances aiming to prohibit the possession of handguns by almost all private citizens. These municipalities claimed that the ordinances aimed to protect their residents from loss of property, injury, or death due to firearms. Petitioners Otis McDonald, Adam Orlov, Colleen Lawson, and David Lawson brought suit against Chicago and Oak Park, arguing that the laws seeking to prohibit the possession of handguns left residents vulnerable and unable to protect themselves against intruders or criminals. The petitioners argued the firearms laws violated the Second Amendment right to bear arms.[2]
The district court dismissed the suits. The petitioners appealed the decision, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.[2][1]
Oral argument
Oral arguments were held on March 2, 2010. The case was decided on June 28, 2010.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 5-4 to reverse the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the opinion of the court, joined in part by Justices Anthony Kennedy, John Roberts, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas. Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas wrote concurring opinions, while justices Stephen Breyer and John Paul Stevens authored dissenting opinions.[2]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the court, argued that previous cases have set the precedent that all rights outlined in the Bill of Rights are applicable to the states, thus limiting the ability of municipalities to pass laws and ordinances that infringe on these rights:[2]
| “ | Unless we turn back the clock or adopt a special incorporation test applicable only to the Second Amendment, municipal respondents’ argument must be rejected. Under our precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental from an American perspective, then, unless stare decisis counsels otherwise, that guarantee is fully binding on the States and thus limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values. [3] | ” |
| —Samuel Alito, majority opinion in McDonald v. Chicago[2] | ||
Concurring opinions
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, arguing that Justice Steven's dissenting opinion inappropriately mischaracterizes the Due Process Clause and its applicability to the states:[2]
| “ | Justice Stevens claims that I mischaracterize his argument by referring to the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, instead of “the interest in keeping a firearm of one’s choosing in the home,” the right he says petitioners assert. Post, at 38, n. 36. But it is precisely the 'Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms' that petitioners argue is incorporated by the Due Process Clause. Under Justice Stevens’ own approach, that should end the matter. See post, at 26 ('[W]e must pay close attention to the precise liberty interest the litigants have asked us to vindicate'). In any event, the demise of watered-down incorporation, see ante, at 17–19, means that we no longer subdivide Bill of Rights guarantees into their theoretical components, only some of which apply to the States. The First Amendment freedom of speech is incorporated—not the freedom to speak on Fridays, or to speak about philosophy.[3] | ” |
| —Antonin Scalia, concurring opinion in McDonald v. Chicago[2] | ||
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in part with the majority opinion, in which he argued the right to bear arms is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause:[2]
| “ | Applying what is now a well-settled test, the plurality opinion concludes that the right to keep and bear arms applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it is 'fundamental' to the American 'scheme of ordered liberty,' ante, at 19 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 149 (1968)), and ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ ante, at 19 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997)). I agree with that description of the right. But I cannot agree that it is enforceable against the States through a clause that speaks only to 'process.' Instead, the right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.[3] | ” |
| —Clarence Thomas, concurring opinion in McDonald v. Chicago[2] | ||
Dissenting opinions
Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, wrote a dissenting opinion arguing the Second Amendment does not include a fundamental right to bear arms for self-defense purposes:[2]
| “ | I shall therefore separately consider the question of 'incorporation.' I can find nothing in the Second Amendment’s text, history, or underlying rationale that could warrant characterizing it as 'fundamental' insofar as it seeks to protect the keeping and bearing of arms for private self-defense purposes. Nor can I find any justification for interpreting the Constitution as transferring ultimate regulatory authority over the private uses of firearms from democratically elected legislatures to courts or from the States to the Federal Government. I therefore conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment does not 'incorporate' the Second Amendment’s right 'to keep and bear Arms.' And I consequently dissent.[3] | ” |
| —Stephen Breyer, dissenting opinion in McDonald v. Chicago[2] | ||
Justice John Paul Stevens authored a dissenting opinion, challenging the majority's interpretation of substantive due process by arguing a strict national standard being imposed on states places significant costs on American citizens:[2]
| “ | In a federalist system such as ours, however, this approach can carry substantial costs. When a federal court insists that state and local authorities follow its dictates on a matter not critical to personal liberty or procedural justice, the latter may be prevented from engaging in the kind of beneficent 'experimentation in things social and economic' that ultimately redounds to the benefit of all Americans. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The costs of federal courts’ imposing a uniform national standard may be especially high when the relevant regulatory interests vary significantly across localities, and when the ruling implicates the States’ core police powers.[3] | ” |
| —John Paul Stevens, dissenting opinion in McDonald v. Chicago[2] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
McDonald v. Chicago strengthened the precedent established in District of Columbia v. Heller, holding that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense and is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.[1][2]
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Oyez, "McDonald v. Chicago," accessed August 18, 2022
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 Justia, "McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)," accessed August 18, 2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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