Arguments in favor of broad appeals of agency actions to Article III courts
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Individuals adversely affected by agency adjudication decisions may seek to appeal those decisions to Article III courts. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides for the appeal of federal agency actions in certain cases. Article III courts can exercise judicial review to interpret the law and overturn any appealed agency actions that are inconsistent with the law.[1]
The APA allows individuals adversely affected by agency decisions who have exhausted all internal agency appeals to appeal those decisions for judicial review as long as the challenged action is a final agency action with no other adequate remedy. A final agency action, according to the U.S. Supreme Court in Bennett v. Spear (1997), must have exhausted all internal agency appeals and must either determine rights or obligations or result in legal consequences.[2][3]
The APA excludes judicial review when other statutes preclude judicial review or when the agency action "is committed to agency discretion by law." In addition to the appeal of agency adjudication decisions, outside groups with an interest in agency decisionmaking may also seek to challenge agency decisions through judicial review by Article III courts.[1][4]
In order for an Article III court to review an appealed agency decision or other legal challenge, the plaintiff in the case must first demonstrate standing to bring their case before the court. To learn more about the debate surrounding procedural due process rights in the context of standing, click here.
The scope of access to judicial review of agency action through appeals to Article III courts is a topic of debate among administrative law scholars. Some scholars support broad access to judicial review of challenged agency actions, claiming that judicial review strengthens due process and agency accountability. Other scholars support limited judicial review of agency action, arguing in part that Article III courts would be overwhelmed by the high volume agency appeals.
This page presents scholarly arguments in favor of broad access to judicial review of appealed agency actions.
There are two main arguments in favor of a broad approach to judicial review of appealed agency actions:
- Click the arrow (▼) in the list below to see claims under each argument.
1. Argument: Due process is strengthened by the broad ability to appeal agency actions
2. Argument: Broad appeals to Article III courts increase agency accountability
- Claim: Article III courts promote public oversight of agency activity
- Claim: Broad appeals of agency action to Article III courts increase opportunities for judicial review of agency action
Argument: Due process is strengthened by the broad ability to appeal agency actions
Supporters of broad appeals of agency action to Article III courts argue that broad access to judicial review of agency action strengthens due process by allowing individuals more opportunities to challenge agency decisions. The ability to challenge government action, according to this argument, contributes to a robust legal system.
Claim: Broad appeals to Article III courts allow individuals to challenge unlawful agency action
Supporters of broad appeals of agency action to Article III courts claim that the opportunity for judicial review of agency action allows individuals to seek redress when they are adversely affected by government action. The opportunity to challenge an adverse agency action, according to this claim, strengthens due process.
- In his 1991 article "Due Process, Judicial Review, and the Rights of the Individual," administrative law scholar Edward Re described judicial review of agency action as a means to facilitate due process:
- "The modern emphasis on due process, the availability of creative judicial remedies, and the role of the courts in reviewing actions of government officials, are some of the reasons which have caused countless persons to resort to the courts for a redress of all sorts of grievances. While these cases may burden the courts, they are also an expression of confidence in the judicial system. It is a tribute to the American legal system that any person can challenge governmental action in a court of law, and have the realistic expectation that, if there is a legitimate relevance, the wrong or grievance will be redressed."[5]
- Andrew Wetzler, an attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council, claimed in a 2011 blog post that judicial review provides an avenue for individuals to seek relief from unlawful agency action:
- "This is exactly why judicial review of agency decisions is important. Not only because it provides a remedy for citizens and State governments to address federal agency actions that are illegal, but because it provides those agencies with a more general incentive to listen to, and take seriously, the suggestions, perspective, and critiques of its constituents."[6]
Argument: Broad appeals to Article III courts increase agency accountability
Supporters of broad access to appeals of agency action to Article III courts argue that judicial review strengthens agency accountability. Broad access to appeals of action, according to this argument, increases public oversight of agency activity. Supporters also contend that increased judicial oversight of agency activity allows judges to correct a higher volume of legal errors committed by agencies.
Claim: Article III courts promote public oversight of agency activity
Supporters of broad appeals of agency action to Article III courts claim that judicial review of agency decisionmaking allows individuals to play a role in monitoring agency activity. The resulting increase in public oversight, according to this claim, increases agency accountability.
- Administrative law scholars William D. Araiza and Robert G. Dreher described this claim in their 2004 article "Judicial Review Under the APA of Agency Inaction in Contravention of a Statutory Mandate: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance". The authors contend that judicial review supports agency accountability by giving individuals the tools to monitor agency action:
- "Judicial review of agency action serves important societal purposes, broadly embodied in the notion of the rule of law. Judicial review promotes fidelity by agencies to statutory directives and guards against undue influence by private interests in the regulatory process. The lack of normal safeguards of electoral accountability and separation of powers for administrative agencies makes concerns regarding factional influence over governmental processes and disregard of democratically reached public policies especially intense in the administrative context. The availability of judicial review for persons injured by agency action moderates these concerns, serving as an essential constraint upon the exercise of arbitrary or venal power by administrative agencies."[7]
- In their 2018 paper "Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume Agency Adjudication," administrative law scholars Jonah B. Gelbach and David Marcus described the ability of judges to correct agency problems through judicial review as "problem-oriented oversight.” Gelbach and Marcus contend that problem-oriented oversight strengthens agency accountability, in part, by pushing agencies to improve:
- "Courts identify and respond to entrenched problems of internal agency administration that can afflict adjudication. When bias discolors an IJ’s decision-making and the agency does not respond, for example, courts can do so effectively. When the SSA issues a guidance document that distorts ALJ orders denying disability benefits claims, the federal courts can push the agency to correct course. Problem-oriented oversight involves more than the correction of adjudicator error or the issuance of precedent-setting opinions. The federal courts use various tools at their disposal to hold agencies accountable and insist that they improve. Added to the other functions federal courts discharge, problem-oriented oversight strengthens the case for Article III review of high volume agency adjudication."[8]
Claim: Broad appeals of agency action to Article III courts increase opportunities for judicial review of agency action
Supporters of broad appeals of agency action to Article III courts claim that targeted judicial review of agency action furthers agency accountability by allowing judges to review agency action. Agency expertise, according to this claim, is not infallible and judicial review provides an added layer of agency oversight.
- Administrative law scholar Gary Leedes described this claim in his 1978 article "Understanding Judicial Review of Federal Agency Action: Kafkaesque and Langdellian." Leedes claimed that judicial review of agency action can promote government accountability, while narrowed doctrines of standing and reviewability could conserve judicial resources:
- "But as more and more judges realize that agency expertise has been oversold, and that bows 'to the mysteries of administrative expertise' are increasingly inappropriate, the Supreme Court, aware of the impact of judicial review on the orderly conduct of the government's business including the drain on federal court resources (checklist factor #5), has begun to tighten up the just recently liberalized doctrines of standing, reviewability and the other instrumental doctrines of judicial review that control the quantity of cases, as well as the type of cases, decided by the federal courts."[9]
See also
- Taxonomy of arguments about due process and procedural rights in the context of the administrative state
- Procedural due process rights (administrative state)
External links
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Congressional Research Service, "A Brief Overview of Rulemaking and Judicial Review," accessed July 23, 2020
- ↑ Law Library—American Law and Legal Information, "Administrative Law and Procedure—Judicial Review Of Agency Actions," accessed October 22, 2020
- ↑ New York University Law Review, "Final Agency Action in the Administrative Procedure Act," November 2017
- ↑ U.S. Legal, "Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions," accessed July 22, 2020
- ↑ Cleveland State Law Review, "Due Process, Judicial Review, and the Rights of the Individual," 1991
- ↑ Natural Resources Defense Council, "Why We Need Judicial Review: The (Newest) Wolf Rider," July 8, 2011
- ↑ Environmental Law Reporter, "Judicial Review Under the APA of Agency Inaction in Contravention of a Statutory Mandate: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance," 2004
- ↑ Texas Law Review, "Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume Agency Adjudication," 2018
- ↑ University of Richmond Law Review, "Understanding Judicial Review of Federal Agency Action: Kafkaesque and Langdellian," 1978
