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Arguments in favor of limited appeals of agency actions to Article III courts
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Individuals adversely affected by agency adjudication decisions may seek to appeal those decisions to Article III courts. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides for the appeal of federal agency actions in certain cases. Article III courts can exercise judicial review to interpret the law and overturn any appealed agency actions that are inconsistent with the law.[1]
The APA allows individuals adversely affected by agency decisions who have exhausted all internal agency appeals to appeal those decisions for judicial review as long as the challenged action is a final agency action with no other adequate remedy. A final agency action, according to the U.S. Supreme Court in Bennett v. Spear (1997), must have exhausted all internal agency appeals and must either determine rights or obligations or result in legal consequences.[2][3]
The APA excludes judicial review when other statutes preclude judicial review or when the agency action "is committed to agency discretion by law." In addition to the appeal of agency adjudication decisions, outside groups with an interest in agency decisionmaking may also seek to challenge agency decisions through judicial review by Article III courts.[1][4]
In order for an Article III court to review an appealed agency decision or other legal challenge, the plaintiff in the case must first demonstrate standing to bring their case before the court. To learn more about the debate surrounding procedural due process rights in the context of standing, click here.
The scope of access to judicial review of agency action through appeals to Article III courts is a topic of debate among administrative law scholars. Some scholars support broad access to judicial review of challenged agency actions, claiming that judicial review strengthens due process and agency accountability. Other scholars support limited judicial review of agency action, arguing in part that Article III courts would be overwhelmed by the high volume agency appeals.
This page presents scholarly arguments in favor a limited approach to judicial review of appealed agency actions.
There are three main arguments in favor of limited approach to judicial review of appealed agency actions:
- Click the arrow (▼) in the list below to see claims under each argument.
2. Argument: Limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts conserve judicial resources
3. Argument: Limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts protect statutory intent
Argument: Limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts protect against government overreach
Supporters of limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts argue that narrow applications of judicial review help to protect agency expertise from government overreach. Judges, according to this argument, are generalists who should only interfere in specialized agency decisionmaking in limited circumstances.
Claim: Limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts prevent judicial overreach into agency decisionmaking
Supporters of limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts claim that the judicial branch oversteps its authority when it reviews agency actions that require agency expertise. Judges interfere with agency specialists, according to this claim, when they attempt to address individual agency actions through judicial review.
- Administrative law scholars David R. Woodward and Ronald M. Levin described this claim in their 1979 article "In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action." The authors contend that agencies are in the best position to decipher and implement complex congressional mandates:
- "It remains true, however, that to the extent that the validity of a particular administrative ruling depends on practical experience with individual circumstances, rather than on guidelines extrapolated from a statute through the customary tools of construction, the arguments in favor of deference to an agency (which we have shown to be substantial even on 'legal' questions) become far more compelling. One core concept underlying the allocation of power between courts and agencies has always been that judges are generalists, while administrators specialize in their particular area of responsibility. Nothing could be more wasteful, and more deleterious to cohrent administration of a regulatory program, than to have courts duplicate the efforts of agencies in applying legal concepts to every individual situation that comes along. The consistency of those legal concepts with the mandates of Congress should be, and is, scrutinized by the courts with only so much deference to the agency's construction as the circumstances warrant. But when that task is completed, we believe it is appropriate to leave the implementation of those judicially declared guidelines primarily to the specialists."[5]
Argument: Limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts conserve judicial resources
Supporters of limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts argue that the high volume of agency adjudication necessitates constraints on access to judicial review. Unbounded agency appeals, according to this argument, would overwhelm the Article III courts.
Claim: The federal administrative judiciary was created out of practical necessity as an alternative to Article III courts
Supporters of limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts claim that federal agency tribunals were created in order to curb the flood of appeals to the Article III judiciary. Agency tribunals, according to this claim, are themselves overwhelmed by high caseloads. Supporters contend that limited appeals to Article III courts allow administrative tribunals to manage agency cases without burdening judicial resources.
- Administrative Law Judge H. Alexander Manuel defended limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts in a 2018 article "Judges and the Administrative State." Manuel claimed that administrative tribunals prevent agency adjudication from overwhelming the federal judiciary:
- “The federal administrative judiciary was created out of public necessity. Article III judges will acknowledge that it is simply not possible for their courts to handle the plethora of litigation and appeals generated by administrative agencies. Of the hundreds of federal subagencies today, just three of those subagencies—the Social Security Administration, Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals, and the U.S. Immigration Court—are reported to maintain a backlog of approximately 3 million cases. There are also thousands of other pending cases. Not only would these numbers overwhelm the Article III courts, they pose extraordinary challenges for administrative tribunals as well.”[6]
Argument: Limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts protect statutory intent
Supporters of limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts argue that Article III review of agency decisionmaking ignores Congress' intent to allow agencies to implement directives. Unbounded Article III review of agency actions, according to this argument, allows the judiciary to substitute its judgment for the intent of Congress.
Claim: Limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts prevent the judiciary from subverting the will of Congress
Supporters of limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts claim that Article III courts undermine the intent of Congress when they substitute their own judgment for that of agency experts. Limited appeals of agency action to Article III courts, according to this claim, protect congressional intent and agency discretion.
- Woodward and Levin described this claim, contending that judicial review of agency action can conflict with congressional intent to allow agencies to interpret and implement the law:
- "On judicial review of an order issued under such a mandate, it would be anomalous for a court to decide whether a certain action would serve 'the public interest' while giving no weight whatsoever to the agency's view (except on factual matters). Similarly, when a statute directs an agency to promulgate regulations 'to carry out the purposes of this statute' it would be fundamentally erroneous for a court to measure a regulated individual's action against the statute alone, without any reference to the agency's conclusions. In such a situation, 'de novo' review would directly undermine Congress' purposes, because the legislature's intention was to leave the question primarily to the agency.[5]
See also
- Taxonomy of arguments about due process and procedural rights in the context of the administrative state
- Procedural due process rights (administrative state)
External links
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Congressional Research Service, "A Brief Overview of Rulemaking and Judicial Review," accessed July 23, 2020
- ↑ Law Library—American Law and Legal Information, "Administrative Law and Procedure—Judicial Review Of Agency Actions," accessed October 22, 2020
- ↑ New York University Law Review, "Final Agency Action in the Administrative Procedure Act," November 2017
- ↑ U.S. Legal, "Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions," accessed July 22, 2020
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Administrative Law Review, "In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action," 1979
- ↑ American Bar Association, "Judges and the administrative state," May 9, 2018
