Benton v. Maryland
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| Benton v. Maryland | |
| Reference: 395 U.S. 784 | |
| Term: 1969 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: December 12, 1968 Decided: June 23, 1969 | |
| Outcome | |
| Maryland Court of Special Appeals vacated and remanded | |
| Majority | |
| Thurgood Marshall • Warren Burger • Hugo Black • William Douglas • William Brennan | |
| Concurring | |
| Byron White | |
| Dissenting | |
| John Harlan II • Potter Stewart | |
Benton v. Maryland is a case decided on June 23, 1969, by the United States Supreme Court that incorporated the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to states. The case concerned an individual being reindicted by a grand jury for a charge for which he had been previously acquitted. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.[1][2]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to states. To read more about the impact of Benton v. Maryland click here.
Background
A Maryland court charged Benton with larceny and burglary in August 1965. He was not found guilty of larceny, but he was sentenced to 10 years in prison for the burglary charge. He appealed his sentence on the grounds that the grand jury that had indicted him had been selected unconstitutionally. He was awarded his appeal and faced a different grand jury, which indicted him for larceny and burglary. He was found guilty of both charges, which Benton appealed on the grounds that reindicting him for the larceny charge was unconstitutional because he had already been acquitted for that charge.
The Maryland state court ruled that the double jeopardy clause did not apply in state court criminal proceedings.[1][2]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on December 12, 1968, and the case was reargued on March 24, 1969. The case was decided on June 23, 1969.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 6-2 to vacate the decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Byron White wrote a concurring opinion. Justice John Harlan II wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Potter Stewart.[2]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the court, argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Palko v. Connecticut was overruled. Marshall contended that the constitutional rights incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment were applicable in both state and federal cases.[2]
| “ | Palko represented an approach to basic constitutional rights which this Court's recent decisions have rejected. It was cut of the same cloth as Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), the case which held that a criminal defendant's right to counsel was to be determined by deciding in each case whether the denial of that right was 'shocking to the universal sense of justice.' Id. at 316 U. S. 462. It relied upon Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), which held that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was not an element of Fourteenth Amendment due process. Betts was overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); Twining, by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964). Our recent cases have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion that basic constitutional rights can be denied by the States as long as the totality of the circumstances does not disclose a denial of 'fundamental fairness.' Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice,' Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 391 U. S. 149, the same constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments. Palko's roots had thus been cut away years ago. We today only recognize the inevitable.[3] | ” |
| —Thurgood Marshall, majority opinion in Benton v. Maryland[2] | ||
Concurring opinion
Justice Byron White, in a concurring opinion, highlighted his agreement with the decision of the majority. White wrote an opinion to emphasize his thoughts on how the concurrent sentence doctrine should be applied.[2]
| “ | I agree with the Court that the concurrent sentence rule, while not of jurisdictional dimensions, should be preserved as a matter of proper judicial administration both on direct appeal and collateral attack, although, at least in theory, it raises a number of questions concerning the subsequent effects of the unreviewed counts. It may be that, where it can be reliably predicted in a particular case that each count would entail concrete prejudicial consequences at a later date, the appellate court at the time of initial review would prefer to deal with all counts, rather than to apply the concurrent sentence rule.[3] | ” |
| —Byron White, concurring opinion in Benton v. Maryland[2] | ||
Dissenting opinion
Justice John Harlan II, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Potter Stewart, argued that the concurrent sentence doctrine should have been applicable in this case. Harlan contended that it is unconstitutional to refuse to apply the doctrine and that the Supreme Court should not be authorized to consider the constitutional issue of the incorporation of the double jeopardy clause.[2]
| “ | One of the bedrock rules that has governed, and should continue to govern, the adjudicative processes of this Court is that the decision of constitutional questions in the disposition of cases should be avoided whenever fairly possible. Today the Court turns its back on that sound principle by refusing, for the flimsiest of reasons, to apply the 'concurrent sentence doctrine' so as not to be required to decide the far-reaching question whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is 'incorporated' into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, thereby making the former applicable lock, stock, and barrel to the States. Indeed, it is quite manifest that the Court has actually been at pains to 'reach out' to decide that very important constitutional issue.
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” |
| —John Harlan II, dissenting opinion in Benton v. Maryland[2] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
- See also: Incorporation
Benton v. Maryland established that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to state court criminal proceedings.[2]
The decision in this case overruled Palko v. Connecticut and was responsible for incorporating the right to protection against double jeopardy to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Incorporation is the process of binding a fundamental right onto the states through a Supreme Court decision.
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Oyez, "Benton v. Maryland," accessed August 23, 2022
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 Justia, "Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)," accessed August 23, 2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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