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Palko v. Connecticut
 | |
| Palko v. Connecticut | |
| Reference: 302 U.S. 319 | |
| Term: 1937 | |
| Outcome | |
| Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed | |
| Majority | |
| Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes • Hugo Black • Louis Brandeis • Benjamin Cardozo • James C. McReynolds • Owen Roberts • Harlan Fiske Stone • George Sutherland | |
| Dissenting | |
| Pierce Butler | |
Palko v. Connecticut is a case decided on December 6, 1937, by the United States Supreme Court holding that double jeopardy was not a fundamental right. The case concerned whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to the states. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors. The decision in this case was overruled by Benton v. Maryland in 1969.[1][2][3]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established a standard for fundamental rights under the U.S. Constitution. To read more about the impact of Palko v. Connecticut click here.
Background
On September 30, 1935, Frank Palka allegedly shot and killed two police officers in Bridgeport, Connecticut, after he shattered a window of a music store and stole a radio.[4] He had prior legal proceedings against him for juvenile delinquency and statutory rape. Palka was arrested in Buffalo, New York, and returned to Connecticut to face charges. Palka confessed to the killings. He was indicted in Fairfield County, Connecticut, on charges of murder in the first degree, a capital felony in Connecticut at the time. During his trial, the presiding judge refused to admit Palka's confession into evidence. Absent the confession, a jury convicted Palka of second-degree murder and he was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison.
With the permission of the presiding judge in the trial, state prosecutors appealed the jury verdict to the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, citing a Connecticut statute that permitted appeals of trial court judgments if the judge committed "serious trial error." On appeal, the Supreme Court of Errors reversed the judgment, ordering a new trial. The court,[3]
| “ |
...found that there had been error of law to the prejudice of the state (1) in excluding testimony as to a confession by defendant; (2) in excluding testimony upon cross-examination of defendant to impeach his credibility; and (3) in the instructions to the jury as to the difference between first and second degree murder. [5] |
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Palka was brought to trial a second time in accordance with the Supreme Court of Errors' ruling. Prior to a jury being impaneled, Palka's attorney "made the objection that the effect of the new trial was to place him twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and in so doing to violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." That objection was overruled. The trial proceeded and a jury convicted Palka of murder in the first degree. The court sentenced Palka to death. The Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the judgment of conviction and the sentence of death on appeal. Palka appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.[3][6][7]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on November 12, 1937. The case was decided on December 6, 1937.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 8-1 to affirm the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors. Justice Benjamin Cardozo delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Pierce Butler dissented.[3]
Opinion
Opinion of the court
Justice Benjamin Cardozo delivered the opinion of the court for an eight-justice majority. After a review of the factual and procedural background of Palka's case history, Justice Cardozo presented the issue before the court:[3]
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The argument for appellant is that whatever is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment is forbidden by the Fourteenth also. The Fifth Amendment, which is not directed to the States, but solely to the federal government, creates immunity from double jeopardy ... To retry a defendant, though under one indictment and only one, subjects him, it is said, to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment, if the prosecution is one on behalf of the United States. From this the consequence is said to follow that there is a denial of life or liberty without due process of law, if the prosecution is one on behalf of the people of a state ... Thirty-five years ago a like argument was made to this court in Dreyer v. Illinois ... and was passed without consideration of its merits as unnecessary to a decision. The question is now here. [5] |
” |
The Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause stipulates that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The 14th Amendment's due process clause says that "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Thus, the issue for the court was whether the Fifth Amendment provision that prohibits the federal government from double jeopardy was binding on state governments also—if, in putting Palka "twice...in jeopardy of life or limb" via a second trial for the same offense, the actions of Connecticut constituted a state action to deprive Palka of life or liberty absent due process, which is prohibited by the 14th Amendment.[3]
Does the 14th Amendment make the Bill of Rights binding on state governments?
Justice Cardozo entertained, but ultimately rejected, Palka's argument that the 14th Amendment's due process clause made all protections of the Bill of Rights against federal government action binding on state governments as well. In Justice Cardozo's words, "We have said that in appellant's view the Fourteenth Amendment is to be taken as embodying the prohibitions of the Fifth. His thesis is even broader. Whatever would be a violation of the original bill of rights (Amendments 1 to 8) if done by the federal government is now equally unlawful by force of the Fourteenth Amendment if done by a state. There is no such general rule."[3]
Justice Cardozo identified provisions in the Bill of Rights that the court had, in previous cases, held were not binding on states. The provisions Justice Cardozo cited were the requirement of securing an indictment by a grand jury for felony criminal charges, the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, and the requirement of a jury trial in criminal (Sixth Amendment) and civil (Seventh Amendment) actions.
That said, Justice Cardozo identified that some provisions of the Bill of Rights had been made binding on state governments via the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Justice Cardozo included, inter alia, the right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right of peaceful assembly, and a right to counsel in a capital case.[3]
A "scheme of ordered liberty"
Justice Cardozo defined a "rationalizing principle" by which to determine when and if a provision of the Bill of Rights should be made binding on a state government via the 14h Amendment's due process clause.[3]
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There emerges the perception of a rationalizing principle which gives to discrete instances a proper order and coherence. The right to trial by jury and the immunity from prosecution except as the result of an indictment may have value and importance. Even so, they are not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish them is not to violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' ... Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them. [5] |
” |
Justice Cardozo further distinguished this principle between rights that were and were not binding on state governments:[3]
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We reach a different plane of social and moral values when we pass to the privileges and immunities that have been taken over from the earlier articles of the Federal Bill of Rights and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption. These in their origin were effective against the federal government alone. If the Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed them, the process of absorption has had its source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. [5] |
” |
Does double jeopardy qualify?
Through Justice Cardozo's rationale, a principle emerges that the 14th Amendment's due process clause makes binding on states those rights that are "fundamental"; that is, rights that are "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty ... that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."[3] Based on this rationale, the question for the court in Palka's case was whether or not double jeopardy constituted such a fundamental right.
Regrettably for Palka, the answer was no.[3]
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Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a hardship so acute and shocking that our policy will not endure it? Does it violate those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions'? ... The answer surely must be 'no.' ... The state ... asks no more than this, that the case ... go on until there shall be a trial free from the corrosion of substantial legal error. ... This is not cruelty at all, nor even vexation in any immoderate degree. If the trial had been infected with error adverse to the accused, there might have been review at his instance, and as often as necessary to purge the vicious taint. A reciprocal privilege, subject at all times to the discretion of the presiding judge ... has now been granted to the state. There is here no seismic innovation. The edifice of justice stands, its symmetry, to many, greater than before. [5] |
” |
Decision
Having determined that the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy was not a fundamental right and, thus, was not binding on state governments via the 14th Amendment's due process clause, Palka's conviction was upheld. On April 12, 1938, Palka was executed in Connecticut's electric chair.[6]
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
- See also: Benton v. Maryland
In the years after the court's decision in Palko, numerous rights were interpreted by the Supreme Court as being fundamental and were made binding on states via a Supreme Court decision, a process that is known as incorporation. Thus, when the Supreme Court makes a protection of the Bill of Rights binding on a state, the court is said to have incorporated that right to state governments via the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Unfortunately for Palka, double jeopardy would not be incorporated to states until 1969, when the court issued its opinion in Benton v. Maryland.
Below is a table of rights that have been incorporated to states via a U.S. Supreme Court decision.
Note: Click on a column heading to sort the data.
| Incorporated rights | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Amendment | Provision | Case | Citation | Year |
| 1st Amendment | Establishment of religion | Everson v. Board of Education | 330 U.S. 1 | 1947 |
| 1st Amendment | Free exercise of religion | Cantwell v. Connecticut | 310 U.S. 296 | 1940 |
| 1st Amendment | Freedom of speech | Gitlow v. New York | 268 U.S. 652 | 1925 |
| 1st Amendment | Freedom of the press | Near v. Minnesota | 283 U.S. 697 | 1931 |
| 1st Amendment | Freedom of peaceful assembly | DeJonge v. Oregon | 299 U.S. 353 | 1937 |
| 1st Amendment | Freedom for petition of redress of grievance | Hague v. Cmte. for Industrial Organization | 307 U.S. 496 | 1939 |
| 2nd Amendment | Right to bear arms | McDonald v. Chicago | 561 U.S. 742 | 2010 |
| 4th Amendment | Unreasonable search and seizure | Wolf v. Colorado | 338 U.S. 25 | 1949 |
| 4th Amendment | Exclusionary rule | Mapp v. Ohio | 367 U.S. 643 | 1961 |
| 5th Amendment | Protection against self-incrimination | Malloy v. Hogan | 378 U.S. 1 | 1964 |
| 5th Amendment | Protection against double jeopardy | Benton v. Maryland | 395 U.S. 784 | 1969 |
| 5th Amendment | Eminent domain/Takings clause | Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad v. City of Chicago | 166 U.S. 226 | 1897 |
| 6th Amendment | Speedy trial | Klopfer v. North Carolina | 386 U.S. 213 | 1967 |
| 6th Amendment | Public trial | In re Oliver | 333 U.S. 257 | 1948 |
| 6th Amendment | Right to an impartial jury | Parker v. Gladden | 385 U.S. 363 | 1966 |
| 6th Amendment | Right to a jury in criminal felony trials | Duncan v. Louisiana | 391 U.S. 145 | 1968 |
| 6th Amendment | Right to notice of accusation | Cole v. Arkansas | 333 U.S. 196 | 1948 |
| 6th Amendment | Right to confront/cross-examine witnesses | Pointer v. Texas | 380 U.S. 400 | 1965 |
| 6th Amendment | Right to compel witnesses | Washington v. Texas | 388 U.S. 14 | 1967 |
| 6th Amendment | Right to counsel in capital felony cases | Powell v. Alabama | 287 U.S. 45 | 1932 |
| 6th Amendment | Right to counsel in criminal felony cases | Gideon v. Wainwright | 372 U.S. 335 | 1963 |
| 6th Amendment | Right to counsel in criminal misdemeanor cases when possibility of incarceration exists | Argersinger v. Hamlin | 407 U.S. 25 | 1972 |
| 8th Amendment | Protection against cruel and unusual punishment | Robinson v. California | 370 U.S. 660 | 1962 |
The court has not incorporated the following provisions of the Bill of Rights to states via the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause:
- Third Amendment protection against quartering soldiers
- Fifth Amendment right to prosecution on an indictment by a grand jury
- Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases
- Eighth Amendment protection against excessive bail and fines
The fundamental right to privacy, which was incorporated via the court's opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, does not stem from the express language of the Constitution, as the word privacy does not appear in the document.
Because the court has not incorporated every provision of the Bill of Rights to state governments (i.e., total incorporation) but has done so on a case-by-case basis (i.e., selective incorporation), the court's holding in Barron v. Baltimore is still considered a valid precedent; that case held that the Bill of Rights was only binding on the actions of the federal government, not state governments.
Case notes
- According to Howard Ball, the reason Palka's name was misspelled Palko was due to a recording error made by the Clerk of the Supreme Court.[7]
- Justice Pierce Butler was the only justice that dissented from the court's opinion, however, Justice Butler did not write a dissenting opinion.
- In 1965, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors changed its name to the Connecticut Supreme Court.
See also
External links
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Oyez, "Palko v. Connecticut," accessed September 8, 2022
- ↑ Justia, "Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)," accessed September 8, 2022
- ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 Supreme Court of the United States (via Findlaw), Palko v. Connecticut, decided December 6, 1937
- ↑ See Case notes: Palka's name was misspelled as "Palko" in court documents.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Epstein, L., and Walker, T. (2004). Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and Justice (5th ed.) Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. (pages 86-90)
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 Ball, H. (2002). The Supreme Court in the Intimate Lives of Americans: Birth, Sex, Marriage, Childrearing, and Death. New York, N.Y.: New York University Press. (page 13)
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