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Textualism
Textualism is a method of statutory interpretation whereby the plain text of a statute is used to determine the meaning of the legislation. Instead of attempting to determine statutory purpose or legislative intent, textualists adhere to the objective meaning of the legal text.[1] Textualism may also refer to a set of practical techniques used by jurists to determine the application of a statute through close consideration of its text.[2]
Plain Meaning Rule
Textualism is consistent with the Plain Meaning Rule. The plain meaning of a word is determined by its dictionary definition, its placement in the body of the text, and its common usage at the time the statute was written. A judge that relies solely on the literal or plain meaning of a text does not consider supporting or supplementary sources, such as modern social policy or legislative history, when interpreting a statute.[1]
Factors considered in textual interpretation
Speaker's meaning and sentence meaning
Textualism, as a speech-related theory, "assumes a distinction" between speaker’s meaning and sentence meaning. The speaker’s meaning, or author's meaning, of a given text is the meaning that the speaker intended the audience to take from what he or she said. In other words, when someone speaks or writes for a specific audience—for instance, one that is familiar with the author’s writing or subject topic—the author can take into account what he or she knows about the audience and what the audience knows about him or her and may adjust the text or language accordingly.[2]
Sentence meaning, as opposed to speaker’s meaning, is the meaning that a text has when there is no private information or understanding shared between the audience and the author.[2]
Textualism and the general public
Experts who view textualism as a normative theory of interpretation aim for interpretations that yield the plain meaning, or sentence meaning, of the legal text. Although “[t]exts that are directed to a particular audience on a particular occasion may have speaker's meaning”; in general, textualists argue that the plain meaning of the text "best serves the rule of law values of publicity, predictability, certainty, and stability of the law."[2] In other words, textualists maintain that the rulings of the courts must be accessible to ordinary citizens. Lay citizens are likely to interpret statutes to have their plain meaning, because ordinary citizens do not have the access to or the expertise to understand legislative history.[2]
Noted textualists
Frank Easterbrook
Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is a noted textualist who uses textualism in a matter of interpreting judicial power to the letter of the law. Easterbrook is one of the most noted federal intermediate appeals judges who is a textualist.
A predominant theme in Easterbrook’s arguments for textualism is that legislation is a product of a “messy process of compromise” in which lawmakers may vote for legislation for “reasons that have little or nothing to do with the content of the legislation itself.”[3] As such, legislative history is an unreliable guide to legislative intent. As Easterbrook notes in his work "Statutes’ Domains,"
| “ | “It is fairly easy to show that someone with control of the agenda can manipulate the choice so that the legislature adopts proposals that only a minority supports. The existence of agenda control makes it impossible for a court—even one that knows each legislator’s complete table of preferences—to say what the whole body would have done with a proposal it did not consider in fact.”[4][5] | ” |
Antonin Scalia
Associate Justice of the United States Antonin Scalia was considered to be a textualist and an originalist.
Scalia argued against judges treating the United States Constitution as a Living Constitution. Instead, Scalia urged judges to adopt a textualist method of interpretation, noting that judicial interpretation should be "guided by the text and not by intentions or ideals external to it, and by the original meaning of the text, not by its evolving meaning over time."[6]
See also
External links
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Dougherty, C. (2008). Textualism. Detroit, MI: Macmillan. (pages 21-22)
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Legal Theory Lexicon, "Legal Theory Lexicon 030: Textualism," accessed January 4, 2016
- ↑ Killebrew, Paul. "Where are all the Left-Wing Textualists?" New York University Law Review Vol. 82, No. 6. (2007): page 1906
- ↑ Easterbrook, Frank. "Statutes’ Domains." The University of Chicago Law Review Vol. 50. (1983): pages 547-548
- ↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ Claremont McKenna College, "The Textualist Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia," accessed January 5, 2016
