Chamness v. Bowen
Chamness v. Bowen is a case that was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit on July 3, 2013.
Case background
The case was brought by Michael Chamness, a candidate for a special congressional election in California seeking to run with the party preference label "independent". The state election authority listed Chamness on the ballot as having "no party preference”, in accordance with California's top-two primary system. On February 17, 2011, Chamness sued state election officials—collectively referred to as 'Bowen' after Debra Bowen, then-California Secretary of State—in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Chamness sought a preliminary injunction to suspend California's top-two primary system in his special election, so that he could associate as he saw fit. On March 30, 2011, the Central District of California denied Chamness' request. On May 6, 2011, Chamness and other plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. The court denied the request on July 14, 2011, and granted summary judgment for the defendants a month later.[2]
Chamness et al. appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, challenging the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument in the case on February 13, 2013.
Primary election policy in California
- See also: Primary elections in California
California utilizes a top-two primary system. In a top-two primary system, all candidates are listed on the same ballot. The top two vote-getters, regardless of their partisan affiliations, advance to the general election. Consequently, it is possible that two candidates belonging to the same political party could win in a top-two primary and face off in the general election. The top-two primary system was adopted in California as the result of a 2010 ballot measure. Any registered voter may participate in the primary and vote for any candidate, regardless of his or her partisan affiliation.[3][4][5]
Outcome
On July 3, 2013, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the Central District of California's ruling, holding:[2][5]
| “ | Chamness argues the state violated his First Amendment rights by prohibiting him from using the ballot label “Independent” and forcing him to choose between a preferred party designation, “No Party Preference,” or a blank space on that part of the ballot. We hold that Chamness has failed to establish that SB 6 severely burdened his rights, and uphold the constitutionality of the statute as reasonably related to furthering the state's important interest in efficiently regulating elections.
The only possible difference between the two phrases that has been suggested is that “Independent” may evoke a positive view—that the candidate affirmatively rejects the politics of the other parties. “No Party Preference” might, on the other hand, evoke a neutral or even negative view—that the candidate is apathetic to the views of the other parties; i.e., while he does not identify with them, he does not reject them. Chamness, however, failed to provide any evidence that the two phrases are actually likely to be understood by voters to convey these different meanings, and, if they do, that the distinction would tend to affect the way voters cast their votes. Considered in context, we cannot assume these facts in the absence of evidence. To the contrary, we assume the ballot was presented to a well-informed electorate, familiar with the qualified political parties it has seen on past ballots. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party (2008). Moreover, had Chamness believed that “No Party Preference” had negative connotations even to well-informed voters, he could have requested that his name appear next to a blank space, which was permitted under the version of SB 6 in effect during Chamness' candidacy. The fact that the regulation in this case is viewpoint neutral as to the required term “No Party Preference” supports the conclusion that it imposes only a slight burden on speech. See Rubin v. City of Santa Monica (2002). The restriction does not allow any candidates to term themselves “Independents” and does allow all candidates to put themselves forward on the primary ballot and gather votes. That candidates not identified on the ballot as preferring a particular party must use the term “No Party Preference” or leave the space blank rather than designating themselves as an “Independent” has no viewpoint implications, and so, for that reason as well, imposes a “[l]esser burden [ ]” on speech. ... The state also has an important interest in managing its ballots. Timmons (1997) ... If the state were to allow Chamness to use the term “Independent,” various candidates could then seek to place other designations on the ballot in lieu of a party preference. Those self-designations might, for example, indicate specific political ideologies, or the absence thereof. ... Or candidates could propose designations containing language or messages inappropriate for ballots, such as those containing profanity or promoting racism or sexism. Limiting the ballot designations to political parties, a prescribed term (“No Party Preference”), or a blank space avoids both the problem of allowing questionable self-designation and the alternative prospect of having to make case-by-case governmental decisions regarding the acceptability of various self-designations. We therefore hold that the law in this case represents a reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction that imposes a slight burden on speech and is sufficiently supported by the state's important regulatory interests. ... Additionally, under the California system, multiple candidates may state they prefer the same political party, weakening any argument that the law seeks to guarantee the success of certain political parties. To the contrary, when multiple candidates state they prefer a single political party, the voters cannot know from the ballot which candidate, if any, the party actually endorses. Allowing multiple candidates to state they prefer a single political party, in addition, may dilute the party's support among those candidates. Given these considerations, an otherwise well-supported candidate with “No Party Preference” could, at least theoretically, benefit from the statutory scheme. Rosen does not, therefore, dictate a contrary outcome to the one we reach in this case.[6] |
” |
| —Judge James Carr | ||
See also
- Electoral systems in California
- Primary elections in California
- Top-two primary
- Ranked-choice voting
External links
- Search Google News for this topic
- Chamness v. Bowen (2013)
- Constitution Annotated, "Amdt 1.8.1 Overview of Freedom of Association"
- Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party (2008)
- Rubin v. City of Santa Monica (2002)
- Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party (1997)
Footnotes
- ↑ Constitution Annotated, "Amdt 1.8.1 Overview of Freedom of Association," accessed March 17, 2025
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, Chamness v. Bowen, decided July 3, 2013
- ↑ FairVote, "Who Can Vote in Congressional Primaries," accessed August 17, 2017
- ↑ National Conference of State Legislatures, "State Primary Election Types," July 21, 2016
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Willamette University | Law, "Chamness v. Bowen," accessed December 29, 2013 Cite error: Invalid
<ref>tag; name "willamette" defined multiple times with different content - ↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
