Davis v. Bandemer
 | |
| Davis v. Bandemer | |
| Docket number: 84-1244 | |
| Term: 1985-1986 | |
| Court: Supreme Court of the United States | |
| Important dates | |
| Argument: October 7, 1985 Decided: June 30, 1986 | |
| Court membership | |
| Chief Justice Warren Burger • William Brennan • Byron White • Thurgood Marshall • Harry Blackmun • Lewis Powell • William Rehnquist • Sandra Day O'Connor • John Paul Stevens | |
Davis v. Bandemer was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1986. The case was brought by a group of Indiana Democrats who alleged that the apportionment of Indiana's state legislature diluted the impact of Democratic votes in key districts in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Amendment XIV, United States Constitution. On June 30, 1986, the high court ruled that Indiana's district plans did not constitute an illegal partisan gerrymander. The court did, however, maintain that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause (i.e., that federal courts have the right to intervene in such matters).[1]
Background
- See also: Redistricting in Indiana
Case history
In 1982, a group of Indiana Democrats filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, alleging that "the 1981 reapportionment plan [for the Indiana General Assembly] constituted a political gerrymander intended to disadvantage Democrats, and that the particular district lines that were drawn and the mix of single-member and multimember districts were intended to and did violate their right, as Democrats, to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment." The district court ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, invalidating the 1981 redistricting plan. The district court decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which heard oral argument in the case on June 30, 1986. The following questions were presented to the high court:[1][2]
- "Is political gerrymandering justiciable?"
- If so, "did the districting in Indiana violate the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause?"
Decision
On June 30, 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled 6-3 that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable (i.e., that federal courts have the right to intervene in such matters). The majority on this particular question comprised Associate Justices Byron White, William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and John Paul Stevens. The plurality opinion was penned by White and joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. White wrote the following in the court's plurality opinion:[2][3]
| “ | Here, none of the identifying characteristics of a nonjusticiable political question are present. Disposition of the case does not involve this Court in a matter more properly decided by a coequal branch of the Government. There is no risk of foreign or domestic disturbance. Nor is this Court persuaded that there are no judicially discernible and manageable standards by which political gerrymandering cases are to be decided. The mere fact that there is no likely arithmetic presumption, such as the "one person, one vote" rule, in the present context does not compel a conclusion that the claims presented here are nonjusticiable. The claim is whether each political group in the State should have the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political group, and this Court declines to hold that such claim is never justiciable. That the claim is submitted by a political group, rather than a racial group, does not distinguish it in terms of justiciability.[4] | ” |
| —Associate Justice Byron White | ||
On the question of the constitutionality of Indiana's apportionment plan, the court ruled 7-2 to reverse the district court's decision, finding that Indiana's plan did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The majority on this particular question comprised Chief Justice Warren Burger and Associate Justices Byron White, William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist, and Sandra Day O'Connor.[2][3]
An opinion that concurred in part (on the question of the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims) and dissented in part (on the specific question of the constitutionality of Indiana's apportionment plan) was penned by Powell and joined by Stevens. Another opinion that concurred in part (on the specific question of Indiana's apportionment plan) and dissented in part (on the question of the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims) was penned by O'Connor and joined by Burger and Rehnquist. O'Connor wrote the following in her opinion:[2][3]
| “ | The Equal Protection Clause does not supply judicially manageable standards for resolving purely political gerrymandering claims, and does not confer group rights to an equal share of political power. ... [Members]of the major political parties cannot claim that they are vulnerable to exclusion from the political process, and it has not been established that there is a need or a constitutional basis for judicial intervention to resolve political gerrymandering claims. The costs of judicial intervention will be severe, and such intervention requires courts to make policy choices that are not of a kind suited for judicial discretion. Nor is there any clear stopping point to prevent the gradual evolution of a requirement of roughly proportional representation for every cohesive political group. Accordingly, political gerrymandering claims present a nonjusticiable political question.[4] | ” |
| —Sandra Day O'Connor | ||
See also
External links
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Oyez, "Davis v. Bandemer," accessed December 12, 2017
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Supreme Court of the United States, "Davis v. Bandemer: Opinion," June 30, 1986
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Oxford Reference, "Davis v. Bandemer," accessed December 12, 2017
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
