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Nader v. Schaffer

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Nader v. Schaffer is a case that was decided by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on July 14, 1976.


HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: The case concerned associational rights guaranteed by the First Amendment—protecting one’s right to associate with others holding similar beliefs, values, or political views.[1] The plaintiffs, two unaffiliated voters in Connecticut, alleged that a state election law stipulating that only registered party members could participate in a partisan primary violated their voting and associational rights.
  • Outcome: The district court rejected the complaint, and the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed that decision.[2][3]

  • Case background

    A Connecticut law enacted in 1956 stipulated that only the registered members of a political party could participate in that party's primary election, and unaffiliated voters could not participate in a party's primary. Two registered but unaffiliated Connecticut voters—Nathra Nader and Albert C. Snyder, Jr., collectively referred to as 'Nader' in the case—sued Gloria Schaffer in her official capacity as Connecticut's Secretary of State. Nader claimed that participation in partisan primary elections "is an exercise of the constitutionally protected right to vote and of the constitutionally protected right to associate with others in support of a candidate ... [and] there is a constitutionally protected correlative right not [sic] to associate, and to be free from coerced associations" and to keep one's associations private.[4] They alleged that the Connecticut statute in question violated these rights by prohibiting them from participating in a party's primary election without publicly declaring their affiliation with that party in advance.[3][4]

    Secretary Schaffer, joined by the Democratic and Republican parties of Connecticut, moved to dismiss the case. A three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut—Circuit Judge Robert P. Anderson, Chief Judge T. Emmet Clarie, and District Judge Mosher Joseph Blumenfeld—were assigned to consider the case.[4]

    Primary election policy in Connecticut

    See also: Primary elections in Connecticut

    Primary elections allow voters to determine which candidates compete in the general election and can be nonpartisan or partisan. In partisan primaries, voters choose the candidates they prefer for a political party to nominate in the general election.

    The laws governing primary elections vary from state to state and can even vary within states by locality and political party. For example, only registered party members are allowed to vote in closed primaries, while registered party members and unaffiliated voters are allowed to vote in semi-closed primaries, and all voters are allowed to vote in open primaries.

    Primary elections also vary by the way their outcomes are determined. Majority systems require the winning candidate to receive at least fifty percent of the votes cast, while plurality systems do not. In top-two primaries, top-four primaries, and blanket primaries, all candidates are listed on the same ballot, regardless of partisan affiliation.

    Outcome

    The district court panel dismissed the case on July 14, 1976. Judge Anderson penned the court's unanimous opinion. The following is a relevant excerpt of the court's opinion:[4]

    Plaintiffs, Nathra Nader and Albert C. Snyder, Jr., are residents of Winchester, Connecticut. Each has registered as a voter pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 9-20 and 9-21. The basis for this action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and 1343(4), to redress the alleged deprivation, under color of state statute, of certain voting and associational rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, is that plaintiffs refuse to enroll in a political party pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-56 or 9-59 and are, therefore, prohibited from voting in any party primary elections. Because the complaint seeks an order restraining the enforcement of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 9-431 on the grounds of its alleged unconstitutionality, and because the constitutional question raised is not "insubstantial," this three-judge court was convened. 28 U.S.C. § 2281; Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 93 S. Ct. 854, 35 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1973). Plaintiffs have moved, with supporting affidavits, for summary judgment. Defendants, the Secretary of the State of Connecticut, and the Republican and Democratic Parties of Connecticut, have moved to dismiss the complaint. The motion to dismiss is granted and the motion for summary judgment is denied.

    ... A state may legislate to prevent the perceived evils of crossover voting, but several states permit crossover voting in their primaries. Others have provision for primaries which allow participation by independents and members of other parties. There is no suggestion that such a clause makes the election laws unconstitutional, nor is it a mandatory prerequisite to constitutionality that independent, non-member electors be permitted to vote in a party's primary. The Connecticut General Assembly has adopted statutes governing political party primaries which it considers best meet the needs of the State. The laws are not invidiously discriminatory but apply to all alike. The legislatures of '[t]he states have broad discretion in formulating election policies.'

    ... We, therefore, hold that the election laws of the General Statutes of the State of Connecticut, governing primaries are not in violation of the Constitution of the United States, that they provide for legitimate goals through constitutionally permissible means and that there is no need or occasion for the judicial relief requested by the plaintiffs.[5]

    —Judge Robert Anderson


    The plaintiffs appealed the case to the Supreme Court of the United States, which summarily affirmed the District of Connecticut's decision.[6][7]

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes