McCollum v. NEA-Alaska

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McCollum v. NEA-Alaska
Case number: 0:19-cv-35299
Status: Closed
Important dates
Filed: Aug. 2, 2018
District court decision:
March 15, 2019
Appeals court decision:
July 29, 2021
District court outcome
Public-sector unions are not liable to refund agency fees or union dues paid prior to Janus v. AFSCME, and exclusive representation does not violate the First Amendment or antitrust laws.
Appeals court outcome
Affirmed district court's dismissal of the case.

This case is one of over a hundred public-sector union lawsuits Ballotpedia tracked following the U.S. Supreme Court's 2018 decision in Janus v. AFSCME. These pages were updated through February 2023 and may not reflect subsequent case developments. For more information about Ballotpedia's coverage of public-sector union policy in the United States, click here. Contact our team to suggest an update.

McCollum v. NEA-Alaska was decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on July 29, 2021. The plaintiffs, Alaska public school teachers, filed a class-action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska on August 2, 2018, alleging that the defendants "violated the class members’ rights by forcing non-union members to pay compulsory 'agency fees' to NEA-Alaska ... as a condition of their employment, and by forcing nonunion members to accept the union as their exclusive bargaining representative."[1] The district court dismissed the case on March 15, 2019. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's decision on July 29, 2021.[2][3][1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The parties to the suit: The plaintiffs were Kathryn McCollum, David Nees, Carol Carman, Donn Liston, and Timothy Christopherson, all Alaska public school teachers or former teachers. The defendants were the National Education Association (NEA), NEA-Alaska, the Matanuska-Susitna Education Association, and the Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District.
  • The issues: Can public-sector unions be held liable for refunding agency fees and union dues paid prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Janus v. AFSCME, which held that agency fees are unconstitutional? Do exclusive representation laws violate non-union members’ First Amendment rights?
  • The presiding judges: Judge John Sedwick presided over the district court proceedings. A three-judge panel—Senior Judge Mary Schroeder, Senior Judge Barry Silverman, and Judge Mary Murguia—presided over the case in the Ninth Circuit.
  • The outcome: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska's dismissal of the case.
  • Procedural history

    The plaintiffs were Kathryn McCollum, David Nees, Carol Carman, Donn Liston, and Timothy Christopherson, all Alaska public school teachers or former teachers. They were represented by attorneys from Clapp, Peterson, Tiemessen, Thorsness & Johnson LLC; Talcott Franklin P.C.; and Mitchell Law PLLC. Tracy Crockett was a plaintiff in the district proceedings but was not named as a party to the appeal.

    The defendants were the National Education Association (NEA), NEA-Alaska, the Matanuska-Susitna Education Association, and the Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District. They were represented by attorneys from Altshuler Berzon LLP and Jermain Dunnagan & Owens P.C. Claims against the chair and board members of the Alaska Labor Relations Agency were dismissed in February 2019.

    The plaintiffs first filed their lawsuit on August 2, 2018, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska. The plaintiffs sought to certify four classes. The first class included non-members compelled to pay the union agency fees. The second class included non-member religious objectors compelled to pay an amount equal to agency fees to charities chosen by the union. The third class included members who would not have joined the union if non-members were not charged agency fees. The fourth class included non-members who wished to negotiate their own contracts but were bound to the union’s exclusive representation. The plaintiffs sought refunds for agency fees, charity payments in lieu of agency fees, and an amount equal to agency fees for members who paid union dues, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.

    Below is an abbreviated procedural history of the lawsuit:[2][3][1][4][5]

    • August 2, 2018: The plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska.
    • November 13, 2018: The defendants filed a motion to dismiss.
    • December 4, 2018: The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.
    • December 18, 2018: The defendants filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint.
    • February 23, 2019: Claims against the chair and board members of the Alaska Labor Relations Agency were dismissed.
    • March 14, 2019: The court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, arguing that the defendants acted in good faith under the law at the time of collection, that exclusive representation does not violate First Amendment rights according to Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, and that antitrust laws do not apply to public employee bargaining agreements. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice on March 15, 2019.
    • April 12, 2019: Plaintiffs Kathryn McCollum, Timothy C. Christopherson, Carol Carman, Dolores McKee, David Nees, and Donn Liston appealed the court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
    • September 20, 2019: The plaintiffs filed an opening brief.
    • October 2, 2019: Plaintiff Dolores McKee was dismissed from the suit voluntarily.
    • December 20, 2019: The defendants filed an answering brief.
    • July 29, 2021: The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case.

    For a list of available case documents, click here.

    Decision

    District court

    On March 14, 2019, Judge John Sedwick dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. Sedwick wrote the following in the court's opinion:[4]

    Given that the good faith defense is indeed available to private defendants in § 1983 cases, the court must consider whether it in fact shields the Union Defendants from monetary liability here. In line with the three other district courts that have applied the defense under nearly identical facts, the court concludes that it does. As discussed above, "traditional principles of equity and fairness . . . underpin the [good faith] Defense." The Union Defendants collected fair-share fees in accordance with PERA and in accordance with then-binding Supreme Court precedent that upheld the constitutionality of such fees. "It would be highly inequitable to hold private parties retroactively liable for § 1983 damages in such a circumstance." ...

    [...]

    Plaintiffs McKee and Liston were union members who paid union membership dues rather than fair-share fees. They allege that they only became members because they otherwise would have been forced to pay fair-share fees and the difference between the amount of the membership dues and the amount of the fair-share fees "would not have been worth the loss of their vote and whatever little influence they might have been able to exert in collective bargaining matters." That is, they believe the existence of the "unconstitutional agency shop" structure and its accompanying fair-share fees compelled their union membership. They seek a refund of a portion of their union membership fees exceeding the amount of the fair-share fees paid by non-union members. Given that the union members' claim is also based upon pre-Janus collection of fair-share fees, the court concludes that the good-faith defense applies here as well.

    Other reasons support denial of the union members' claims. First, they admit that they made a decision to pay union membership dues in exchange for certain benefits: a right to vote in union elections and the ability to influence collective bargaining efforts. This voluntary choice precludes an argument that they were compelled to subsidize the Union Defendants’ private speech. Indeed, "Janus says nothing about people who join a union, agree to pay dues, and then later change their mind about paying union dues." Their assertion that their union memberships were compelled because they should have had the option to avoid union fees altogether, as Janus now makes clear, is unpersuasive. The fact that plaintiffs would not have opted to pay union membership fees if Janus had been the law at the time of their decision does not mean their decision was therefore coerced.

    Second, Plaintiffs McKee and Liston's agreement to become union members in exchange for benefits created a contract between them and their unions that remains enforceable after Janus. Plaintiffs cannot "seek to claw back money paid in exchange for already-provided contractual benefits . . . based on later changes in the law.” Plaintiffs argue that the Union Defendants cannot rely on this contractual argument to support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) because the contract is not described or referenced in the complaint. However, the complaint admits that Plaintiffs McKee and Liston agreed to pay union membership dues in exchange for membership benefits. This admission alone supports the Union Defendants’ contractual argument. ...

    [...]

    In Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, the Supreme Court held that a system of exclusive union representation does not violate the speech or associational rights of individuals who are not members of the union. Indeed, the Court in Janus reaffirmed as much, distinguishing between compelled financial support for a union's exclusive representation and the underlying system of exclusive union representation and acknowledging that states can continue to require that a union serve as the exclusive bargaining agent for its public employees. ...

    [...]

    Federal antitrust law, which seeks to preserve competition in the private sector, simply does not encompass the way in which a state chooses to set employment terms for its public employees. As to employees not covered by federal labor relations law, Congress left states "free to legislate as they see fit, and [to] apply their own views of proper public policy to the collective bargaining process." ...

    [...]

    The collective bargaining agreements between the Union Defendants and school districts, which are a result of this legislatively authorized system, likewise cannot be challenged under antitrust laws. Although non-state actors, the Union Defendants and school districts are undoubtedly carrying out the state's regulatory scheme through their collective bargaining, and the agreements that stem therefrom, and consequently enjoy state-action immunity from federal antitrust laws as to this conduct. There are no issues of fact to develop on this issue; that is, it is indisputable that the challenged restraint—a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a representative union—is "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy." ...

    [...]

    Based on the preceding discussion, the motions at docket 49 and 53 are GRANTED. Plaintiffs' complaint is hereby dismissed in its entirety.[6]

    Sedwick was appointed to the court in 1992 by President George H.W. Bush (R).

    Appeals court

    On July 29, 2021, a three-judge panel—Senior Judge Mary Schroeder, Senior Judge Barry Silverman, and Judge Mary Murguia—affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. The court's memorandum said:[5]

    The district court properly dismissed the claims of McCollum, Nees, Carman, and Christopherson against NEA-Alaska, Matanuska-Susitna Education Association, and National Education Association ('union defendants') because a public sector union can, as a matter of law, 'invoke an affirmative defense of good faith to retrospective monetary liability under section 1983 for the agency fees it collected' prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31. [Danielson v. Inslee] ...

    Dismissal of Liston’s First Amendment claim against the union defendants was proper because the deduction of union membership dues arose from the private membership agreements between the union defendants and plaintiffs, and 'private dues agreements do not trigger state action and independent constitutional scrutiny.' [Belgau v. Inslee].[6]

    President Jimmy Carter (D) nominated Schroeder to the court, President Bill Clinton (D) nominated Silverman, and President Barack Obama (D) nominated Murguia.

    Legal context

    Janus v. AFSCME (2018)

    See also: Janus v. AFSCME

    On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a 5-4 decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (Janus v. AFSCME), ruling that public-sector unions cannot compel non-member employees to pay fees to cover the costs of non-political union activities.[7]

    This decision overturned precedent established in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education in 1977. In Abood, the high court held that it was not a violation of employees' free-speech and associational rights to require them to pay fees to support union activities from which they benefited (e.g., collective bargaining, contract administration, etc.). These fees were commonly referred to as agency fees or fair-share fees.[7]

    Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for the court majority in Janus, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch. Alito wrote, "Abood was poorly reasoned. It has led to practical problems and abuse. It is inconsistent with other First Amendment cases and has been undermined by more recent decisions. Developments since Abood was handed down have shed new light on the issue of agency fees, and no reliance interests on the part of public-sector unions are sufficient to justify the perpetuation of the free speech violations that Abood has countenanced for the past 41 years. Abood is therefore overruled."[7]

    Related litigation

    To view a complete list of the public-sector labor lawsuits Ballotpedia tracked between 2019 and 2023, click here.


    Number of federal lawsuits by circuit

    Between 2019 and 2023, Ballotpedia tracked 191 federal lawsuits related to public-sector labor laws. The chart below depicts the number of suits per federal judicial circuit (i.e., the jurisdictions in which the suits originated).

    Public-sector labor lawsuits on Ballotpedia

    See also: Public-sector union policy in the United States, 2018-2023

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    See also

    External links

    Case documents

    Appeals court

    Trial court

    Footnotes