Federalist No. 74 by Alexander Hamilton (1788)

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Federalist Number (No.) 74 (1788) is an essay by British-American politician Alexander Hamilton arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. The full title of the essay is "The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

HIGHLIGHTS

Author: Alexander Hamilton

Source: Originally published in the New York Packet on March 25, 1788. Republished in 1788 as part of the collection The Federalist, now referred to as The Federalist Papers.

Abstract: Hamilton discusses the President's control of the military and ability to grant pardons.

Background of the author

Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755-1804) was a British-American politician, lawyer, and military officer. He was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and is considered a Founding Father of the United States. Below is a summary of Hamilton's career:

• 1775-1777: Officer in the New York Provincial Artillery Company
• 1777-1782: Officer in the Continental Army
  • Including service as an adviser to General George Washington
• 1787: Delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pa.
• 1787-1788: Author of 51 of the 85 essays in The Federalist Papers
• 1789-1795: First secretary of the treasury of the United States

Full text of The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive

The full text of Federalist No. 74 reads as follows:

“ To the People of the State of New York: THE President of the United States is to be "commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States WHEN CALLED INTO THE ACTUAL SERVICE of the United States. The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have, in other respects, coupled the chief magistrate with a council, have for the most part concentrated the military authority in him alone. Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority. v "The President may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective officers. This I consider as a mere redundancy in the plan, as the right for which it provides would result of itself from the office. He is also to be authorized to grant "reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT. Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused of weakness or connivance, would beget equal circumspection, though of a different kind. On the other hand, as men generally derive confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency. On these accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government, than a body of men. The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the President has, if I mistake not, been only contested in relation to the crime of treason. This, it has been urged, ought to have depended upon the assent of one, or both, of the branches of the legislative body. I shall not deny that there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of that body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime levelled at the immediate being of the society, when the laws have once ascertained the guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness in referring the expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the judgment of the legislature. And this ought the rather to be the case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded. But there are also strong objections to such a plan. It is not to be doubted, that a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatever. It deserves particular attention, that treason will often be connected with seditions which embrace a large proportion of the community; as lately happened in Massachusetts. In every such case, we might expect to see the representation of the people tainted with the same spirit which had given birth to the offense. And when parties were pretty equally matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers of the condemned person, availing itself of the good-nature and weakness of others, might frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was necessary. On the other hand, when the sedition had proceeded from causes which had inflamed the resentments of the major party, they might often be found obstinate and inexorable, when policy demanded a conduct of forbearance and clemency. But the principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case to the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a welltimed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed, that a discretionary power, with a view to such contingencies, might be occasionally conferred upon the President, it may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable, whether, in a limited Constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic beforehand to take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity. A proceeding of this kind, out of the usual course, would be likely to be construed into an argument of timidity or of weakness, and would have a tendency to embolden guilt. PUBLIUS. ”

Background of the Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Articles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788.

The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution. They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals.

Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed to be amended, not replaced.

Full list of Federalist Papers

The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

The Federalist Papers
Number	Subject	Author
No 1	General Introduction	Hamilton
No 2	Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence	Jay
No 3	Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't)	Jay
No 4	Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't)	Jay
No 5	Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't)	Jay
No 6	Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States	Hamilton
No 7	Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't)	Hamilton
No 8	The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States	Hamilton
No 9	The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection	Hamilton
No 10	The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't)	Madison
No 11	The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy	Hamilton
No 12	The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue	Hamilton
No 13	Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government	Hamilton
No 14	Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered	Madison
No 15	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union	Hamilton
No 16	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton
No 17	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton
No 18	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 19	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 20	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 21	Other Defects of the Present Confederation	Hamilton
No 22	Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con't)	Hamilton
No 23	The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union	Hamilton
No 24	The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered	Hamilton
No 25	The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't)	Hamilton
No 26	The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered	Hamilton
No 27	The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't)	Hamilton
No 28	The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't)	Hamilton
No 29	Concerning the Militia	Hamilton
No 30	Concerning the General Power of Taxation	Hamilton
No 31	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 32	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 33	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 34	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 35	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 36	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 37	Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government	Madison
No 38	The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed	Madison
No 39	The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles	Madison
No 40	The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained	Madison
No 41	General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution	Madison
No 42	The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered	Madison
No 43	The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't)	Madison
No 44	Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States	Madison
No 45	The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered	Madison
No 46	The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared	Madison
No 47	The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts	Madison
No 48	These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other	Madison
No 49	Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention	Hamilton and Madison
No 50	Periodical Appeals to the People Considered	Hamilton and Madison
No 51	The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments	Hamilton and Madison
No 52	The House of Representatives	Hamilton and Madison
No 53	The House of Representatives (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 54	The Apportionment of Members Among the States	Hamilton and Madison
No 55	The Total Number of the House of Representatives	Hamilton and Madison
No 56	The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 57	The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation	Hamilton and Madison
No 58	Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered	Madison
No 59	Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members	Hamilton
No 60	Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't)	Hamilton
No 61	Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't)	Hamilton
No 62	The Senate	Hamilton and Madison
No 63	The Senate (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 64	The Powers of the Senate	Jay
No 65	The Powers of the Senate (con't)	Hamilton
No 66	Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered	Hamilton
No 67	The Executive Department	Hamilton
No 68	The Mode of Electing the President	Hamilton
No 69	The Real Character of the Executive	Hamilton
No 70	The Executive Department Further Considered	Hamilton
No 71	The Duration in Office of the Executive	Hamilton
No 72	The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered	Hamilton
No 73	The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power	Hamilton
No 74	The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive	Hamilton
No 75	The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive	Hamilton
No 76	The Appointing Power of the Executive	Hamilton
No 77	The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered	Hamilton
No 78	The Judiciary Department	Hamilton
No 79	The Judiciary (con't)	Hamilton
No 80	The Powers of the Judiciary	Hamilton
No 81	The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority	Hamilton
No 82	The Judiciary Continued	Hamilton
No 83	The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury	Hamilton
No 84	Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered	Hamilton
No 85	Concluding Remarks	Hamilton

See also

• Federalism
• Federalist Papers
• Anti-Federalist papers

External links

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Footnotes

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