Redistricting in New Mexico

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Redistricting
State-by-state redistricting procedures
Majority-minority districts
Congressional district demographics
United States census, 2020

Redistricting is the process by which new congressional and state legislative district boundaries are drawn. Each of New Mexico's three United States Representatives and 112 state legislators are elected from political divisions called districts. United States Senators are not elected by districts, but by the states at large. District lines are redrawn every 10 years following completion of the United States census. The federal government stipulates that districts must have nearly equal populations and must not discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity.

HIGHLIGHTS

Following the 2010 United States Census, New Mexico was apportioned three congressional seats.

New Mexico's House of Representatives is made up of 70 districts; New Mexico's State Senate is made up of 42 districts.

In New Mexico, both congressional and state legislative district boundaries are drawn by the state legislature.

See the sections below for further information on the following topics:

1. Background: This section summarizes federal requirements for redistricting at both the congressional and state legislative levels. In addition, common state-level requirements are discussed. Recent court decisions affecting redistricting policy are also summarized.
2. State process: This section provides details about the redistricting process in New Mexico, identifying the entities responsible for redistricting and delineating state-imposed requirements.
3. District maps: This section provides information about current congressional and state legislative district maps.
4. Issues: This section discusses issues that intersect with redistricting policy, including electoral competitiveness and the consideration of race and ethnicity in electoral policy.
5. Historical information: This section provides summaries of the redistricting processes that occurred in New Mexico following the 2010 census.
6. State legislation and ballot measures: This section lists state legislation and state and local ballot measures relevant to redistricting policy.

Background

This section includes background information on federal requirements for congressional redistricting, state legislative redistricting, state-based requirements, redistricting methods used in the 50 states, gerrymandering, and recent court decisions.

Federal requirements for congressional redistricting

According to Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, the states and their legislatures have primary authority in determining the "times, places, and manner" of congressional elections. Congress may also pass laws regulating congressional elections.

“	The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.	”
—United States Constitution

Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution stipulates that congressional representatives be apportioned to the states on the basis of population. There are 435 seats in the United States House of Representatives. Each state is allotted a portion of these seats based on the size of its population relative to the other states. Consequently, a state may gain seats in the House if its population grows or lose seats if its population decreases, relative to populations in other states. In 1964, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Wesberry v. Sanders that the populations of House districts must be equal "as nearly as practicable."

The equal population requirement for congressional districts is strict. According to All About Redistricting, "Any district with more or fewer people than the average (also known as the 'ideal' population), must be specifically justified by a consistent state policy. And even consistent policies that cause a 1 percent spread from largest to smallest district will likely be unconstitutional."

Federal requirements for state legislative redistricting

The United States Constitution is silent on the issue of state legislative redistricting. In the mid-1960s, the United States Supreme Court issued a series of rulings in an effort to clarify standards for state legislative redistricting. In Reynolds v. Sims, the court ruled that "the Equal Protection Clause [of the United States Constitution] demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races." According to All About Redistricting, "it has become accepted that a [redistricting] plan will be constitutionally suspect if the largest and smallest districts [within a state or jurisdiction] are more than 10 percent apart."

State-based requirements

In addition to the federal criteria noted above, individual states may impose additional requirements on redistricting. Common state-level redistricting criteria are listed below.

1. Contiguity refers to the principle that all areas within a district should be physically adjacent. A total of 49 states require that districts of at least one state legislative chamber be contiguous (Nevada has no such requirement, imposing no requirements on redistricting beyond those enforced at the federal level). A total of 23 states require that congressional districts meet contiguity requirements.
2. Compactness refers to the general principle that the constituents within a district should live as near to one another as practicable. A total of 37 states impose compactness requirements on state legislative districts; 18 states impose similar requirements for congressional districts.
3. A community of interest is defined by FairVote as a "group of people in a geographical area, such as a specific region or neighborhood, who have common political, social or economic interests." A total of 24 states require that the maintenance of communities of interest be considered in the drawing of state legislative districts. A total of 13 states impose similar requirements for congressional districts.
4. A total of 42 states require that state legislative district lines be drawn to account for political boundaries (e.g., the limits of counties, cities, and towns). A total of 19 states require that similar considerations be made in the drawing of congressional districts.

Methods

In general, a state's redistricting authority can be classified as one of the following:

1. Legislature-dominant: In a legislature-dominant state, the legislature retains the ultimate authority to draft and enact district maps. Maps enacted by the legislature may or may not be subject to gubernatorial veto. Advisory commissions may also be involved in the redistricting process, although the legislature is not bound to adopt an advisory commission's recommendations.
2. Commission: In a commission state, an extra-legislative commission retains the ultimate authority to draft and enact district maps. A non-politician commission is one whose members cannot hold elective office. A politician commission is one whose members can hold elective office.
3. Hybrid: In a hybrid state, the legislature shares redistricting authority with a commission.

Gerrymandering

In 1812, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry signed into law a state Senate district map that, according to the Encyclopædia Britannica, "consolidated the Federalist Party vote in a few districts and thus gave disproportionate representation to Democratic-Republicans." The word gerrymander was coined by The Boston Gazette to describe the district.

See also: Gerrymandering

The term gerrymandering refers to the practice of drawing electoral district lines to favor one political party, individual, or constituency over another. When used in a rhetorical manner by opponents of a particular district map, the term has a negative connotation but does not necessarily address the legality of a challenged map. The term can also be used in legal documents; in this context, the term describes redistricting practices that violate federal or state laws.

For additional background information about gerrymandering, click "[Show more]" below.

Show more

The phrase racial gerrymandering refers to the practice of drawing electoral district lines to dilute the voting power of racial minority groups. Federal law prohibits racial gerrymandering and establishes that, to combat this practice and to ensure compliance with the Voting Rights Act, states and jurisdictions can create majority-minority electoral districts. A majority-minority district is one in which a racial group or groups comprise a majority of the district's populations. Racial gerrymandering and majority-minority districts are discussed in greater detail in this article.

The phrase partisan gerrymandering refers to the practice of drawing electoral district maps with the intention of favoring one political party over another. In contrast with racial gerrymandering, on which the Supreme Court of the United States has issued rulings in the past affirming that such practices violate federal law, the high court had not, as of November 2017, issued a ruling establishing clear precedent on the question of partisan gerrymandering. Although the court has granted in past cases that partisan gerrymandering can violate the United States Constitution, it has never adopted a standard for identifying or measuring partisan gerrymanders. Partisan gerrymandering is described in greater detail in this article.

Recent court decisions

See also: Redistricting cases heard by the Supreme Court of the United States

The Supreme Court of the United States has, in recent years, issued several decisions dealing with redistricting policy, including rulings relating to the consideration of race in drawing district maps, the use of total population tallies in apportionment, and the constitutionality of redistricting commissions. The rulings in these cases, which originated in a variety of states, impact redistricting processes across the nation.

For additional background information about these cases, click "[Show more]" below.

Show more

Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP (2024)

See also: Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP

Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP — This case concerns a challenge to the congressional redistricting plan that the South Carolina legislature enacted after the 2020 census. In January 2023, a federal three-judge panel ruled that the state's 1st Congressional District was unconstitutional and enjoined the state from conducting future elections using its district boundaries. The panel's opinion said, "The Court finds that race was the predominant factor motivating the General Assembly’s adoption of Congressional District No. 1...Defendants have made no showing that they had a compelling state interest in the use of race in the design of Congressional District No. 1 and thus cannot survive a strict scrutiny review." Thomas Alexander (R)—in his capacity as South Carolina State Senate president—appealed the federal court's ruling, arguing: :In striking down an isolated portion of South Carolina Congressional District 1 as a racial gerrymander, the panel never even mentioned the presumption of the General Assembly’s “good faith.”...The result is a thinly reasoned order that presumes bad faith, erroneously equates the purported racial effect of a single line in Charleston County with racial predominance across District 1, and is riddled with “legal mistake[s]” that improperly relieved Plaintiffs of their “demanding” burden to prove that race was the “predominant consideration” in District 1. The U.S. Supreme Court scheduled oral argument on this case for October 11, 2023.

Moore v. Harper (2023)

See also: Moore v. Harper

At issue in Moore v. Harper, was whether state legislatures alone are empowered by the Constitution to regulate federal elections without oversight from state courts, which is known as the independent state legislature doctrine. On November 4, 2021, the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a new congressional voting map based on 2020 Census data. The legislature, at that time, was controlled by the Republican Party. In the case Harper v. Hall (2022), a group of Democratic Party-affiliated voters and nonprofit organizations challenged the map in state court, alleging that the new map was a partisan gerrymander that violated the state constitution. On February 14, 2022, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the state could not use the map in the 2022 elections and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court adopted a new congressional map drawn by three court-appointed experts. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the North Carolina Supreme Court's original decision in Moore v. Harper that the state's congressional district map violated state law. In a 6-3 decision, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that the "Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent authority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections.

Merrill v. Milligan (2023)

See also: Merrill v. Milligan

At issue in Merrill v. Milligan, was the constitutionality of Alabama's 2021 redistricting plan and whether it violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A group of Alabama voters and organizations sued Secretary of State John Merrill (R) and the House and Senate redistricting chairmen, Rep. Chris Pringle (R) and Sen. Jim McClendon (R). Plaintiffs alleged the congressional map enacted on Nov. 4, 2021, by Gov. Kay Ivey (R) unfairly distributed Black voters. The plaintiffs asked the lower court to invalidate the enacted congressional map and order a new map with instructions to include a second majority-Black district. The court ruled 5-4, affirming the lower court opinion that the plaintiffs showed a reasonable likelihood of success concerning their claim that Alabama's redistricting map violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Gill v. Whitford (2018)

See also: Gill v. Whitford

In Gill v. Whitford, decided on June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the plaintiffs—12 Wisconsin Democrats who alleged that Wisconsin's state legislative district plan had been subject to an unconstitutional gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments—had failed to demonstrate standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to bring a complaint. The court's opinion, penned by Chief Justice John Roberts, did not address the broader question of whether partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. Roberts was joined in the majority opinion by Associate Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Kagan penned a concurring opinion joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Associate Justice Clarence Thomas penned an opinion that concurred in part with the majority opinion and in the judgment, joined by Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch.

Cooper v. Harris (2017)

See also: Cooper v. Harris

In Cooper v. Harris, decided on May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, finding that two of North Carolina's congressional districts, the boundaries of which had been set following the 2010 United States Census, had been subject to an illegal racial gerrymander in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the court's majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor (Thomas also filed a separate concurring opinion). In the court's majority opinion, Kagan described the two-part analysis utilized by the high court when plaintiffs allege racial gerrymandering as follows: "First, the plaintiff must prove that 'race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.' ... Second, if racial considerations predominated over others, the design of the district must withstand strict scrutiny. The burden shifts to the State to prove that its race-based sorting of voters serves a 'compelling interest' and is 'narrowly tailored' to that end." In regard to the first part of the aforementioned analysis, Kagan went on to note that "a plaintiff succeeds at this stage even if the evidence reveals that a legislature elevated race to the predominant criterion in order to advance other goals, including political ones." Justice Samuel Alito delivered an opinion that concurred in part and dissented in part with the majority opinion. This opinion was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy.

Evenwel v. Abbott (2016)

See also: Evenwel v. Abbott

Evenwel v. Abbott was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2016. At issue was the constitutionality of state legislative districts in Texas. The plaintiffs, Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenninger, argued that district populations ought to take into account only the number of registered or eligible voters residing within those districts as opposed to total population counts, which are generally used for redistricting purposes. Total population tallies include non-voting residents, such as immigrants residing in the country without legal permission, prisoners, and children. The plaintiffs alleged that this tabulation method dilutes the voting power of citizens residing in districts that are home to smaller concentrations of non-voting residents. The court ruled 8-0 on April 4, 2016, that a state or locality can use total population counts for redistricting purposes. The majority opinion was penned by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2016)

Justice Stephen Breyer penned the majority opinion in Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.

See also: Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2016. At issue was the constitutionality of state legislative districts that were created by the commission in 2012. The plaintiffs, a group of Republican voters, alleged that "the commission diluted or inflated the votes of almost two million Arizona citizens when the commission intentionally and systematically overpopulated 16 Republican districts while under-populating 11 Democrat districts." This, the plaintiffs argued, constituted a partisan gerrymander. The plaintiffs claimed that the commission placed a disproportionately large number of non-minority voters in districts dominated by Republicans; meanwhile, the commission allegedly placed many minority voters in smaller districts that tended to vote Democratic. As a result, the plaintiffs argued, more voters overall were placed in districts favoring Republicans than in those favoring Democrats, thereby diluting the votes of citizens in the Republican-dominated districts. The defendants countered that the population deviations resulted from legally defensible efforts to comply with the Voting Rights Act and obtain approval from the United States Department of Justice. At the time of redistricting, certain states were required to obtain preclearance from the U.S. Department of Justice before adopting redistricting plans or making other changes to their election laws—a requirement struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder (2013). On April 20, 2016, the court ruled unanimously that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that a partisan gerrymander had taken place. Instead, the court found that the commission had acted in good faith to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The court's majority opinion was penned by Justice Stephen Breyer.

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2015)

See also: Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2015. At issue was the constitutionality of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, which was established by state constitutional amendment in 2000. According to Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, "the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof." The state legislature argued that the use of the word "legislature" in this context is literal; therefore, only a state legislature may draw congressional district lines. Meanwhile, the commission contended that the word "legislature" ought to be interpreted to mean "the legislative powers of the state," including voter initiatives and referenda. On June 29, 2015, the court ruled 5-4 in favor of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, finding that "redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the state's prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum and the governor's veto." The majority opinion was penned by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, and Samuel Alito dissented.

State process

See also: State-by-state redistricting procedures

In 37 states, legislatures are primarily responsible for drawing congressional district lines. Seven states have only one congressional district each, rendering congressional redistricting unnecessary. Four states employ independent commissions to draw the district maps. In two states, politician commissions draw congressional district lines.

State legislative district lines are primarily the province of the state legislatures themselves in 37 states. In seven states, politician commissions draw state legislative district lines. In the remaining six states, independent commissions draw the lines.

In New Mexico, congressional and state legislative district boundaries are drawn by the state legislature. These lines are subject to veto by the governor.

State statutes require that state legislative districts be contiguous and compact. Redistricting guidelines adopted in 2011 suggest that congressional and state legislative districts meet the following criteria:

1. All districts should be "reasonably compact."
2. Districts should "not split voting precincts."
3. Districts should "attempt to preserve communities of interest and take into consideration political and geographic boundaries."

These guidelines are nonbinding and may be altered by the legislature at its discretion.

District maps

Congressional districts

See also: United States congressional delegations from New Mexico

Click the above image to enlarge it.
Source: The National Atlas of the United States of America

New Mexico comprises three congressional districts. The map to the right depicts New Mexico's congressional district lines as drawn following the 2010 United States Census. The table below lists New Mexico's current House representatives.

State legislative maps

See also: New Mexico State Senate and New Mexico House of Representatives

New Mexico comprises 42 state Senate districts and 70 state House districts. State senators are elected every four years in partisan elections. State representatives are elected every two years in partisan elections. To access the current state Senate district map, click here. To access the current state House district map, click here.

Issues

Competitiveness

There are conflicting opinions regarding the correlation between partisan gerrymandering and electoral competitiveness. In 2012, Jennifer Clark, a political science professor at the University of Houston, said, "The redistricting process has important consequences for voters. In some states, incumbent legislators work together to protect their own seats, which produces less competition in the political system. Voters may feel as though they do not have a meaningful alternative to the incumbent legislator. Legislators who lack competition in their districts have less incentive to adhere to their constituents’ opinions."

In 2006, Emory University professor Alan Abramowitz and Ph.D. students Brad Alexander and Matthew Gunning wrote, "[Some] studies have concluded that redistricting has a neutral or positive effect on competition. ... [It] is often the case that partisan redistricting has the effect of reducing the safety of incumbents, thereby making elections more competitive."

In 2011, James Cottrill, a professor of political science at Santa Clara University, published a study of the effect of non-legislative approaches (e.g., independent commissions, politician commissions) to redistricting on the competitiveness of congressional elections. Cottrill found that "particular types of [non-legislative approaches] encourage the appearance in congressional elections of experienced and well-financed challengers." Cottrill cautioned, however, that non-legislative approaches "contribute neither to decreased vote percentages when incumbents win elections nor to a greater probability of their defeat."

In 2021, John Johnson, Research Fellow in the Lubar Center for Public Policy Research and Civic Education at Marquette University, reviewed the relationship between partisan gerrymandering and political geography in Wisconsin, a state where Republicans have controlled both chambers of the state legislature since 2010 while voting for the Democratic nominee in every presidential election but one since 1988. After analyzing state election results since 2000, Johnson wrote, "In 2000, 42% of Democrats and 36% of Republicans lived in a neighborhood that the other party won. Twenty years later, 43% of Democrats lived in a place Trump won, but just 28% of Republicans lived in a Biden-voting neighborhood. Today, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to live in both places where they are the overwhelming majority and places where they form a noncompetitive minority."

Congress

See also: United States House of Representatives elections, 2016

In 2016, Ballotpedia analyzed the margins of victory in all 435 contests for the United States House of Representatives. Ballotpedia found that the average margin of victory was 36.6 percent. A total of 321 elections (73.8 percent of all House elections) were won by margins of victory of 20 percent or more. Sixteen elections (3.7 percent of all House elections) were won by margins of victory of less than 5 percent.

In New Mexico, all three elections for the United States House of Representatives were won by margins of victory of 20 percent or greater. The smallest margin of victory occurred in District 3, where Ben Ray Lujan (D) won by 24.8 percent. The greatest margin of victory occurred in District 1, where Michelle Lujan Grisham (D) won by 30.3 percent. See the table below for full details.

Electoral margins of victory in 2016 United States House of Representatives elections, New Mexico
District	Winner	Margin of victory	Total votes cast	Top opponent
New Mexico District 1	Michelle Lujan Grisham	30.3%	277,967	Richard Priem
New Mexico District 2	Steve Pearce	25.5%	228,816	Merrie Soules
New Mexico District 3	Ben Ray Lujan	24.8%	273,342	Michael H. Romero

State legislatures

See also: Margin of victory in state legislative elections

In 2014, Ballotpedia conducted a study of competitive districts in 44 state legislative chambers between 2010, the last year in which district maps drawn after the 2000 census applied, and 2012, the first year in which district maps drawn after the 2010 census applied. Ballotpedia found that there were 61 fewer competitive general election contests in 2012 than in 2010. Of the 44 chambers studied, 25 experienced a net loss in the number of competitive elections. A total of 17 experienced a net increase. In total, 16.2 percent of the 3,842 legislative contests studied saw competitive general elections in 2010. In 2012, 14.6 percent of the contests studied saw competitive general elections. An election was considered competitive if it was won by a margin of victory of 5 percent or less. An election was considered mildly competitive if it was won by a margin of victory between 5 and 10 percent. For more information regarding this report, including methodology, see this article.

In New Mexico, there were nine competitive races for the New Mexico House of Representatives in 2012, compared to five in 2010. There were six mildly competitive House races in 2012, compared to five in 2010. This amounted to a net gain of five competitive elections.

Partisan composition

The tables below summarize the current partisan composition of the New Mexico House of Representatives and the New Mexico State Senate.

House

Partisan composition, New Mexico House of Representatives

As of February 2026
Party	Members
Democratic	44
Republican	26
Other	0
Vacancies	0
Total	70

Senate

Partisan composition, New Mexico State Senate

As of February 2026
Party	Members
Democratic	26
Republican	16
Other	0
Vacancies	0
Total	42

Race and ethnicity

See also: Majority-minority districts

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 mandates that electoral district lines cannot be drawn in such a manner as to "improperly dilute minorities' voting power."

“	No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.	”
—Voting Rights Act of 1965

States and other political subdivisions may create majority-minority districts in order to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A majority-minority district is a district in which minority groups compose a majority of the district's total population. As of 2015, New Mexico was home to three congressional majority-minority districts.

Proponents of majority-minority districts maintain that these districts are a necessary hindrance to the practice of cracking, which occurs when a constituency is divided between several districts in order to prevent it from achieving a majority in any one district. In addition, supporters argue that the drawing of majority-minority districts has resulted in an increased number of minority representatives in state legislatures and Congress.

Critics, meanwhile, contend that the establishment of majority-minority districts can result in packing, which occurs when a constituency or voting group is placed within a single district, thereby minimizing its influence in other districts. Because minority groups tend to vote Democratic, critics argue that majority-minority districts ultimately present an unfair advantage to Republicans by consolidating Democratic votes into a smaller number of districts.

Demographics

See also: Demographics of congressional districts as of 2015 and Demographics of congressional districts as of 2015 (as percentages)

The tables below provide demographic information for each of New Mexico's congressional districts as of 2015. At that time, the population of the largest congressional district, New Mexico's 2nd Congressional District, totaled 703,727, and the population of the smallest, New Mexico's 1st Congressional District, totaled 690,571, which represented a difference of 1.91 percent.

Demographics of New Mexico's congressional districts (as percentages)
District	Hispanic or Latino of any race	White	Black or African American	American Indian and Alaska Native	Asian	Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander	Other	Multiple races
District 1, New Mexico	49.38%	40.14%	2.37%	3.70%	2.22%	0.04%	0.21%	1.94%
District 2, New Mexico	53.77%	37.30%	1.91%	4.92%	0.75%	0.02%	0.13%	1.19%
District 3, New Mexico	40.80%	37.40%	1.71%	16.99%	1.01%	0.06%	0.18%	1.86%
Source: United States Census Bureau, "American Fact Finder: 2015 1-year estimates," accessed May 23, 2017

Demographics of New Mexico's congressional districts
District	Hispanic or Latino of any race	White	Black or African American	American Indian and Alaska Native	Asian	Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander	Other	Multiple races	Total
District 1, New Mexico	340,991	277,223	16,336	25,530	15,339	296	1,461	13,395	690,571
District 2, New Mexico	378,411	262,515	13,433	34,652	5,252	137	922	8,405	703,727
District 3, New Mexico	281,862	258,371	11,828	117,347	6,951	426	1,210	12,816	690,811
Source: United States Census Bureau, "American Fact Finder: 2015 1-year estimates," accessed May 23, 2017

Redistricting after the 2010 census

See also: Redistricting in New Mexico after the 2010 census

Congressional redistricting, 2010

Following the 2010 United States Census, New Mexico neither gained nor lost congressional seats. At the time of redistricting, Democrats controlled both chambers of the state legislature, but a Republican held the governorship. On September 19, 2011, the Senate approved a congressional redistricting plan, but the legislature adjourned before the map could be taken up for a vote in the House. The New Mexico Supreme Court assigned a retired judge, James Hall, to draw the final congressional map. On December 29, 2011, the final map was issued.

State legislative redistricting, 2010

On September 23, 2011, the legislature approved redistricting plans for the state Senate and House, but these were vetoed by the governor on October 7, 2011. The matter was brought before the New Mexico First Judicial District Court, which issued an opinion establishing new state House district lines on January 3, 2012. On February 10, 2012, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that the state House maps must be redrawn, "with instructions for the trial court to reconsider the extent to which mildly larger population deviations would satisfy other state redistricting criteria, to reconsider the partisan impact and incumbent pairings of a court-ordered plan, and to recognize a district protecting Hispanic voters in the Clovis area under the Voting Rights Act." On February 27, 2012, the New Mexico First Judicial District Court issued its second state House redistricting plan, which stood.

On January 16, 2012, the New Mexico First Judicial District Court established new state Senate district lines. The court-issued redistricting plan "focused on minimizing population deviation, and drawing districts to allow Native Americans an effective opportunity to elect candidates of choice under the Voting Rights Act. The court found no need, under the totality of circumstances, to draw maps specifically protecting Hispanic voters under the Voting Rights Act."

State legislation and ballot measures

Redistricting legislation

See state election laws

The following is a list of recent redistricting bills that have been introduced in or passed by the New Mexico state legislature. To learn more about each of these bills, click the bill title. This information is provided by BillTrack50 and LegiScan.

Note: Due to the nature of the sorting process used to generate this list, some results may not be relevant to the topic. If no bills are displayed below, no legislation pertaining to this topic has been introduced in the legislature recently.

Redistricting ballot measures

See also: Redistricting measures on the ballot and List of New Mexico ballot measures

Ballotpedia has tracked no ballot measures relating to redistricting in New Mexico.

Recent news

The link below is to the most recent stories in a Google news search for the terms Redistricting New Mexico. These results are automatically generated from Google. Ballotpedia does not curate or endorse these articles.

Redistricting in New Mexico - Google News

See also

• United States census, 2020
• Redistricting in New Mexico after the 2010 census
• Redistricting
• State-by-state redistricting procedures
• Majority-minority districts
• State legislative and congressional redistricting after the 2010 census
• Margin of victory in state legislative elections before and after the 2010 census
• Margin of victory analysis for the 2014 congressional elections

External links

• All About Redistricting
• National Conference of State Legislatures, "Redistricting Process"
• FairVote, "Redistricting"

Footnotes

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